



Evidence from East Asia
Curtis J. Milhauptt
I. IN TRO DU CTIO N ............................................................................................................................ 170
II. PUZZLE: THE ROLE OF NPOs IN EAST ASIAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ................................... 175
A . K orea ............................................................................................................................... 17 5
B . Ta iw an ............................................................................................................................. 177
C . Jap an ............................................................................................................................... 178
III. THEORY: NPOs, PUBLIC GOODS, TRUST, AND SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP ............................... 181
IV. APPLICATION: NPOS AS INVESTOR PROTECTION ......................................................................... 183
A. Corporate Law Enforcement as a Public Good .............................................................. 184
B. Corporate Law Enforcement in East Asia: Demand and Supply ................................... 186
1. High Statutory Thresholds and Economic Risk .................................................. 187
2. Weak Infrastructure for Private Law Enforcement ............................................ 189
3. Tradition of Shareholder Passivity ..................................................................... 189
4. Constraints on State Enforcement ...................................................................... 191
C. Explaining Cross-Country Diversity in NPO Shareholder Activism .............................. 192
D . Sum m ary ......................................................................................................................... 197
E. Culture as an Alternative Explanation? ......................................................................... 198
V . IM PLICATION S .............................................................................................................................. 199
A. For Comparative Corporate Governance Literature ..................................................... 199
1. Law E nforcem ent ................................................................................................ 200
2. C onvergence ....................................................................................................... 200
B. For Corporate Law Enforcement in Transition Economies ........................................... 201
V I. C O NCLUSION ................................................................................................................................ 206
t Fuyo Professor of Japanese Law and Legal Institutions, and Director, Center for Japanese
Legal Studies, Columbia Law School. For financial support, I thank the Abe Fellowship Program of the
Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies, with funds provided
by the Center for Global Partnership. This paper was researched while I was a Visiting Fellow at the
Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industry (RIETI), which also provided financial assistance. I
am extremely grateful to the President of RIETI, Masahiko Aoki, the Director of Research, Ichiro Araki,
and the entire staff for their generous hospitality. Lawrence Liu and Kon-Sik Kim provided invaluable
intellectual and logistical support for my research on the Taiwanese and Korean legal systems,
respectively. Helpful comments on a previous draft were provided by Mel Eisenberg, Victor Goldberg,
Jeff Gordon, Zohar Goshen, Hasung Jang, Ehud Kamar, Vic Khanna, Joongi Kim, Kon-Sik Kim, Ben
Liebman, Wonhyuk Lim, Kate Litvak, Lawrence Liu, Bentley MacLeod, Kenichi Osugi, Hugh Patrick,
Randal Peerenboom, Mark Ramseyer, Zenichi Shishido, Eric Talley, Mark West, and participants at the
following fora: American Law and Economics Association annual meeting, Columbia Law School
faculty workshop, Harvard Law School Asian law conference, Korea Development Institute conference,
RIETI comparative corporate governance conference, USC Law and Economics Workshop, the
University of Wisconsin Law School, and the World Bank Forum on Corporate Law Enforcement.
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 29: 169
I. INTRODUCTION
Enforcement problems plague shareholder activism and investor
protection efforts in many parts of the world. These problems are particularly
severe in transition economies, where weaknesses in legal and market
constraints are prevalent. The importance of solving this problem has led legal
scholars to consider a range of partial alternative solutions to domestic
enforcement regimes. For example, Bernard Black and Reinier Kraakman
devised a "self-enforcing" corporate law for Russia, designed specifically to
minimize resort to legal authority.' John Coffee has recently emphasized the
role of cross-listings on foreign stock exchanges as a mechanism by which
firms in weak enforcement regimes can bond themselves to "good" corporate
law-by listing on a foreign stock exchange that imposes high disclosure
requirements and subjects listed firms to a stringent foreign regulatory and
2private enforcement regime.
But there is another partial solution to the problem of weak investor
protection and corporate law enforcement, one that has received no theoretical
or empirical attention-the nonprofit organization (NPO).3 This partial
solution emerges from a puzzle at the center of contemporary East Asian
corporate governance: nonprofit organizations have emerged as arguably the
most important corporate law enforcement agents in Korea, Taiwan, and
Japan. In Korea, the shareholders' rights committee of a large, diversified
NPO known as People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) "has
brought the only significant shareholder actions to date,",4 winning two major
court victories, including one against the chairman and managers of a leading
chaebol (a conglomerate dominated by a controlling minority shareholder). In
Taiwan, a nonprofit foundation known as the Securities and Futures Institute
(SFI), established with the support of the government and the financial sector,
has organized and filed de facto class action suits in securities and corporate
fraud cases on behalf of thousands of small investors. In Japan, a group of
activist lawyers and academics calling themselves the Shareholder
[Kabunushi] Ombudsman "dominates the market [for derivative actions], has
1. See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1912 (1996) (noting that "[the self-enforcing model structures corporate
decisionmaking processes to allow large outside shareholders to protect themselves from insider
opportunism with minimal resort to legal authority" through such measures as mandatory cumulative
voting and shareholder and board-level approval of self-interested transactions.)
2. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and
Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (2002).
3. A common definition of an NPO is an organization (formal or informal) that is private,
self-governing, not profit-distributing, and voluntary. INST. FOR POLICY STUDIES, CTR. FOR CIVIL SOC'Y
STUDIES, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AT-A-GLANCE: MAJOR FINDINGS OF THE JOHNS HOPKINS
COMPARATIVE NONPROFIT SECTOR PROJECT, http://www.jhu.edu/-cnp/pdf/glance.pdf.
4. Kon Sik Kim & Joongi Kim, Revamping Fiduciary Duties in Korea: Does Law Matter in
Corporate Governance? [hereinafter Kim & Kim, Revamping Fiduciary Duties], in GLOBAL MARKETS,
DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS: CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN A NEW ERA OF CROSS-BORDER DEALS
373, 389 (Curtis J. Milhaupt ed., 2003) [hereinafter GLOBAL MARKETS].
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no recognizable equal, and has litigated several of the more high profile cases
in Japan."
5
This brand of shareholder activism is puzzling on several levels. First,
the defining characteristic of an NPO is the non-distribution constraint. 6 That
is, while NPOs are not prohibited from making profits, they are prohibited
from distributing profits to their members or others who control them. Why
are three organizations operating within the non-distribution constraint-
rather than institutional investors or individual shareholders represented by
plaintiffs' attorneys-the principal shareholder activists cum corporate law
enforcement agents in the three largest market economies of East Asia?
Second, civil society is a comparatively recent development in this region,
where states have traditionally not created much space for the formation of
organizations pursuing independent objectives. 7 Why is not the phenomenon
of corporate law enforcement by NPO shareholder activists witnessed more
extensively elsewhere, including in countries that have active nonprofit
sectors?8
A partial solution to the puzzle of corporate law enforcement in East
Asia, and the contours of a possible role for nonprofits in improving investor
protection in some other economies, come into focus when we turn from facts
to theory. For considerably longer than corporate law scholars have debated
the causes of cross-country diversity in corporate structures, social scientists
have sought to explain the existence of NPOs, and the vast disparity in the
size of the NPO sector in individual countries around the world. While no
single theory garners universal support, several influential, related theories
help explain the recent phenomenon of NPO shareholder activism in East Asia.
5. Mark D. West, Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence from Japan, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 351,
369 (2001).
6. See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980).
7. See, e.g., Richard Estes, Charitable Foundations in East Asia: Tax Shelters for the Well
Offor Partners in Development?, 22 Soc. DEV. IssuEs 3-14 (2000).
8. Of course, NPOs involved in corporate governance and corporate social responsibility are
now prevalent throughout the world. In the United States, organizations such as the Corporate Library,
the Shareholder Action Network, and the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) seek to
promote good corporate governance. But these organizations differ in significant respects from the
NPOs discussed in this Article. The U.S. NPOs principally serve as information clearinghouses or, as in
the case of IRRC, promote the interests of their large institutional members. They are not civil society
organizations as that term is commonly understood. Also, from an operational standpoint, NPOs in the
United States do not organize plaintiffs in shareholder litigation, though nothing in U.S. tax law appears
to prohibit nonprofits from playing a more direct role in corporate law enforcement by, for example,
holding portfolios of stock so as to exercise shareholders rights. Perhaps the closest analogue outside of
East Asia is Russia's Institute of Corporate Law and Corporate Governance, founded by a former
Chairman of the Federal Commission for the Securities Market of the Russian Federation. This
organization's objective is to protect investor rights by improving corporate governance in Russia. Its
principal method for doing so is creating corporate governance ratings for Russian firms to allow
investors to make informed investment and voting decisions. But it also offers legal consulting services,
assistance with annual shareholders meetings, and due diligence services. (More information on the
Institute of Corporate Law and Corporate Governance can be found on its website, at
http://www.iclg.ru/enservices#lk (last visited Dec. 15, 2003)). The NPOs in East Asia are unique in that
they not only focus their efforts on corporate law and corporate governance per se (as opposed to
broader social issues), but also take direct action in organizing plaintiffs, holding portfolios of stock in
their own right, and actively exercising rights as shareholders themselves (as opposed to the more
passive role of providing information about corporate governance to investors).
2004]
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By extension, understanding the East Asian experience may suggest ways to
improve investor protection elsewhere.
One theory views NPOs as a response to unsatisfied demand for public
goods-demand that grows as societies become more diverse, opening gaps in
supply caused by government and market failures.9 In order to understand
how this theory fits the East Asian experience, note that investor protection in
the form of corporate and securities law enforcement is a public good: many
of the benefits of the enforcement effort accrue to persons who are not
required to bear their share of the enforcement costs. Note as well that demand
for investor protection and "good" corporate governance has grown rapidly in
the region as a result of the Asian financial crisis, domestic corporate scandals,
and persistent economic malaise in Japan. Under these circumstances, if the
infrastructure for private law enforcement is inadequate and the government is
unable or unwilling to meet the increased demand for investor protection, the
"government failure/market failure" theory predicts the emergence of NPOs to
supply investor protection, at least where legal and social conditions for the
development of an NPO sector are favorable.
A related "contract failure" theory views the NPO form as a device to
economize on the costs of producing public goods, particularly where
consumers are unable to evaluate the quality of the goods provided 0 This
theory rests on the premise that the non-distribution constraint inherent in the
NPO form makes it a "trustworthy" supplier where such information
asymmetries are present, because the owners of such organizations have fewer
incentives to take advantage of consumers than the owners of a for-profit firm.
As this Article will show, this theory, applied to the government, helps
explain why the Taiwanese securities regulatory agency supports an investor
protection NPO, and suggests that govemment-NPO partnerships have the
potential to supplement weak state enforcement of corporate and securities
laws.
A third theory focuses on the supply side, noting that the demand for
public good production can only be met by NPOs if there is an adequate stock
of individuals (what might be called "social entrepreneurs") to found and
operate these organizations. 1 This theory recognizes that certain social
environments are more conducive than others to the supply of social
entrepreneurs. The literature has focused on the role of religious competition
in expanding supply, but this is hardly the only environment conducive to
social entrepreneurship. For example, a comparatively larger stock of social
entrepreneurs would likely exist in societies with a history of organized
protest against the government-a circumstance relevant to the East Asian
experience.
9. BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY 25-27 (1988).
10. Hansmann, supra note 6, at 848-854.
11. See, e.g., Estelle James, Introduction to THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 3, 6 (Estelle James ed., 1989).
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While these theories fall short of a fully formed account of NPOs in
corporate law enforcement around the world, 2 they do help explain why NPO
shareholder activists have emerged to fill a shortfall in the supply of investor
protection-related public goods in the increasingly diverse socio-economic
structures of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. This form of law enforcement appears
to be most successful in Korea, where the supply and quality of social
entrepreneurs is highest due to its recent history of organized protest against
authoritarian governments, and where government policy and the legal
environment are conducive to an active NPO sector. The Taiwanese example
is also noteworthy, because the government has consciously co-opted an NPO
into its public good supply chain. The Japanese NPO, comparatively less
prominent than its other East Asian counterparts, reflects both a somewhat
more robust corporate law enforcement environment (hence fewer gaps in the
supply of public goods), a smaller stock of experienced activists, and a
political and legal environment that has traditionally channeled organized
nongovernmental activism into highly localized causes.
NPO shareholder activism in East Asia, which has been the focus of
virtually no theoretical or comparative analysis,' 3 has significant implications
for ongoing academic debates in comparative corporate governance as well as
real-world reform efforts. Academically, two points are well recognized in
comparative corporate governance theory, but not thoroughly explored
empirically. First, the quality of law enforcement is at least as important to
"good" investor protection as high-quality statutory law 4 Second, convergence
of legal systems at the formal level may not eliminate differences in practice.
Conversely, functional equivalents may lead to convergent outcomes even
where significant differences remain among corporate governance systems at
the formal level.
15
The emergence of NPOs as the leading non-state corporate law
enforcement agents in East Asia is a novel and important illustration of both
points. Despite recent, extensive corporate governance reform in all three
countries at the statutory level, the enforcement environment remains
problematic. While by no means perfect, the NPOs analyzed here are
important-perhaps even the only-aggressive enforcement agents in the
12. Jeff Gordon suggested that a valuable extension of this Article would be to develop a more
complete theory of public goods production in corporate governance, focusing on share ownership
patterns and the viability of courts. My goals for this Article, however, are more modest.
13. The activities of the three NPO shareholder activists have been separately described in
several excellent English-language publications cited extensively in Part IV. See Jooyoung Kim and
Joongi Kim, Shareholder Activism in Korea: A Review of How PSPD Has Used Legal Measures to
Strengthen Korean Corporate Governance, 1 J. KOREAN L. 51 (2001) [hereinafter Kim & Kim, PSPD]
(describing the Korean NPO); Lawrence S. Liu, Simulating Securities Class Actions: The Case of
Taiwan, 3 CoRP. GOVERNANCE INT'L 4, 8 (2000) [hereinafter Liu, Simulating Securities Class Actions]
(describing the Taiwanese NPO); West, supra note 5 (describing the Japanese NPO). But no attempt has
been made to explain the emergence of these organizations theoretically or in comparative perspective,
or to examine the academic and practical implications of their activities beyond the confines of the
separate systems in which they operate.
14. See, e.g., Luca Enriques, Off the Books, but on the Record: Evidence from Italy on the
Relevance of Judges to the Quality of Corporate Law, in GLOBAL MARKETS, supra note 4, at 257.
15. Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function,
49 Am. J. CoMP. L. 329, 331 (2001).
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corporate governance environments of the three countries in which they are
active. All three organizations have found ways to improve the quality of
investor protection in their home countries, despite--or perhaps more
accurately, because of-shortcomings in public and private enforcement
mechanisms.
Moreover, the NPO as a supplier of investor protection is a highly
distinctive illustration of functional convergence-that is, the use of strikingly
different institutional forms to accomplish a common objective, such as
corporate law enforcement 16 In East Asia, several markedly different societies
have spontaneously generated an NPO substitute for the attorney-oriented
incentive mechanisms relied upon in the United States to provide law
enforcement-related public goods in the field of corporate governance. Neither
the NPO nor the "private attorney general" ensures an optimal supply of
investor protection, but these two enforcement alternatives are distinct paths
toward the same goal.
Yet the experience of East Asia with NPOs as corporate law enforcers is
not an unalloyed convergence story. Even in their common use of the non-
distribution constraint to advance the objective of investor protection, Japan,
Korea, and Taiwan display striking diversity in the organizational forms,
strategies, and successes of their NPOs. This diversity can be traced to the
distinctive legal, political, and social environments in which NPOs have
emerged and exist in the three systems.
At the level of law reform, the lessons from East Asia for other
transition economies may be significant, particularly where there is hesitation
or inability to replicate the U.S. "private attorney general" model of corporate
law enforcement. While the use of the NPO form as a law enforcement device
has its own serious limitations,17 this innovation is worthy of serious study as
a way to improve the corporate governance environments in China, Russia,
and other transition countries. NPOs may be less effective than other
functional substitutes for domestic enforcement, such as firms bonding
themselves to "good" corporate law through cross-listings on foreign
exchanges. Shareholder activist NPOs are inherently domestic organizations,
however, and that attribute holds out the promise of improving local law
enforcement institutions. The other alternatives discussed in the literature
(save for massive long-term investments in legal infrastructure) generally
involve abandoning local legal regimes.
The Article is organized into six parts. Part II presents the puzzling yet
significant role of nonprofit organizations in the corporate governance
environments of Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. Part III outlines several
complementary theories from social science literature explaining the existence
of NPOs-theories that shed light on the puzzling form corporate law
enforcement has taken in East Asia. Part IV applies these theories in two
ways-first, to explain the emergence of NPO shareholder activism in Japan,
Korea, and Taiwan, and second, to explain why substantial diversity exists in
16. On the distinction between formal and functional convergence, see id.
17. These limitations are explored infra Part V.
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the structure and operations of these NPOs despite their common role as
corporate law enforcement agents. Part V draws implications from this
distinctive East Asian experience for comparative corporate governance
literature and for corporate law enforcement in transitional economies. Part VI
is a brief conclusion.
II. PUZZLE: THE ROLE OF NPOs IN EAST ASIAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
As noted in the Introduction, a puzzling feature of contemporary East
Asian corporate governance is the presence of an organization operating
within the non-distribution constraint as a major corporate law enforcement
agent in each of the three largest market economies in the region. This Part
introduces the puzzle by describing the three shareholder-activist/investor-
protection NPOs operating in Korea, Japan, and Taiwan.
A. Korea
The People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) was
founded in 1994. Legally, it is a nonprofit organization registered with the
Seoul Metropolitan government. Its membership has grown rapidly, from 200
at its founding to over 12,000 currently, so that today, eighty percent of its
monthly budget is funded out of membership fees.18 It has a professional staff
of fifty, but its activities rely heavily on the voluntary participation of lawyers
and other experts. PSPD is actually a nonprofit "holding company" for several
"action bodies" engaged in a wide variety of advocacy efforts, including
judicial oversight and a taxpayer's movement. One of these action bodies is
the Participatory Economic Committee (PEC), which launched a Small
Shareholders Rights Campaign in 1997. The campaign's aim is to protect
minority shareholder rights and improve corporate management by mobilizing
small shareholders to act collectively against the chaebol, i.e., conglomerates
dominated by a controlling minority shareholder, typically the founder or his
family.' 9 The complexity of intra-chaebol firm relationships, the history of
close, if at times contentious, relations with the government, and, above all,
the use of pyramidal and circular shareholding structures by founding families
to maintain control over group firms despite relatively low cash flow rights,
has given rise to some acute corporate governance problems in Korea.
20
Through the activities of the PEC targeting these problems, PSPD has become
18. Unless otherwise noted, factual information in this Section is taken from the PSPD
website, at http://www.pspd.org (last visited Dec. 13, 2003).
19. Hyuk-Rae Kim, NGOs in Pursuit of 'the Public Good' in Korea, in COLLECTIVE GOODS,
COLLECTIVE FUTUREs IN ASIA 58, 66 (Sally Sargeson ed., 2002).
20. See, e.g., Ok-Rial Song, The Legacy of Controlling Minority Structure: A Kaleidoscope of
Corporate Governance Reform in Korean Chaebol, 34 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 183 (2002). For a
recent illustration, see Don Kirk, Purchase of Shares Reignites Governance Debate in Korea, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 24, 2003, at WI (reporting that intra-group purchase of a large block of shares from a
troubled chaebol firm is "viewed as reflecting the cronyism in Korea's conglomerates").
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the leading shareholder activist,21 and indeed, "the most influential citizen...
movement in Korea."
22
PSPD consciously targeted leading companies for its initial activism
efforts, seeking to make them good role models for other firms. 23 While it
engages in a variety of non-legal activities to promote corporate governance,
PSPD has utilized the legal system as one of its principal tools of reform.24
Toward this end, it holds a portfolio of stock so that it has standing to exercise
shareholders' rights. By participating in shareholder meetings, PSPD has
obtained the disclosure of information and managerial acceptance of corporate
governance reform at a number of major chaebol firms, including SK
Telecom, Hyundai Heavy Industries, and Daewoo Corporation. 25 It likewise
successfully sued to nullify resolutions passed at a shareholders meeting
where irregularities occurred. PSPD has also launched several proxy
solicitations aimed at attracting foreign institutional investors to its cause,
sought injunctions against illegal managerial conduct, and filed administrative
complaints against lawyers and accountants for aiding such conduct. 26 In
addition, it successfully proposed a series of reforms to the Commercial Code
and Securities Exchange Act. Most recently, PSPD was instrumental in
initiating an investigation of fraud and insider trading at the SK Group,
Korea's third largest chaebol. The investigation resulted in the prosecution
and conviction of ten senior executives within the group.
Most importantly, PSPD has achieved two major victories in shareholder
derivative suits.27 The first-indeed the first shareholder derivative suit in
Korean history-was a suit against the former directors of Korea First Bank,
filed on behalf of sixty-one minority shareholders. The claim alleged that
directors had accepted bribes in return for the extension of credit to a failing
conglomerate, while instructing staff to proceed with the loans despite
knowledge of the borrower's poor financial condition. A 40 billion won ($44
million) decision was rendered against the directors in 1998.28 As a result,
directors were aware, for the first time, of their fiduciary obligations to their
shareholders. Then, in 2001, PSPD won a judgment in a shareholder
derivative suit brought on behalf of twenty-two shareholders against the
controlling shareholder and nine directors of Samsung Electronics. In the case,
which bears a resemblance to the important American case Smith v. Van
Gorkom,29 the court held the directors liable for failing to exercise business
judgment in the acquisition of a failing target company. As in Van Gorkom,
21. For a detailed discussion of PSPD's corporate governance activities, see Kim & Kim,
PSPD, supra note 13.
22. Ki-Young Sung, Bargaining Small Shareholders' Rights, 492 SISA 74 (1999) (quoted in
Kim, supra note 19, at 68).
23. Kim & Kim, PSPD, supra note 13, at 53.
24. Id. at 54.
25. Kim, supra note 19, at 67.
26. See generally Kim & Kim, PSPD, supra note 13.
27. A derivative suit is brought by a shareholder to enforce a corporate cause of action. The
action seeks recovery, on behalf of the corporation, for damages caused by a director's breach of duty. If
successful, any award (minus attorneys' fees) returns to the corporation.
28. Kim & Kim, PSPD, supra note 13, at 68.
29. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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the court found the directors' conduct to lie beyond the protective confines of
the business judgment rule where negotiations proceeded with undue haste
and inadequate diligence by the board. In addition, the chairman of Samsung
Electronics was found liable for making an illegal political contribution, and
six directors were held liable for approving a related-party transaction on
unfair terms. According to Korean corporate law experts, the Samsung
Electronics case sent an even more powerful message to the business
community than the Korea First Bank case, indicating that even managers of
Korea's most Profitable and well-known firms are legally accountable to their
shareholders. Reinforcing the public goods quality of PSPD's activities in
these cases, the NPO itself was not paid any damages since these were
shareholder derivative suits, and the PSPD attorneys who handled the
litigation provided their services without compensation.
B. Taiwan
The Securities and Futures Institute (SFI) is an ingenious mechanism for
overcoming collective action problems in shareholder litigation. The SFI
holds 1,000 shares (one trading unit) in each public company in Taiwan,
giving it standing to assert claims as a shareholder. 31 It also functions as a
public interest law firm on investor protection issues. The SFI has procedures
in place to take on claims of private investors in securities cases. In cases
where a public prosecution has been initiated, the SFI will either assert its own
claim or bring a "de facto class action" as an agent for other investors.
SFI is not a typical NPO. It was founded as a nonprofit foundation in
1984 through the cooperation of Taiwan's securities regulatory agency and the
local banking and securities industries. 32 The foundation was initially funded
from 1984 to 1987 through a special assessment on securities trading
commissions levied against brokerage firms and- banks. 33 In contrast to most
NPOs, the SFI has a large, highly professional, and experienced staff.34 And
according to its own publication, "[t]he SFI has supported government
national economic development policy since its founding. 35 Thus, in many
respects, SFI is a quasi-public organization. Yet, as explored in more detail in
30. Kim & Kim, Revamping Fiduciary Duties, supra note 4, at 392. In November 2003, a
Korean appellate court affirmed the District Court's finding of liability for illegal political contributions
and related party transactions, but reversed the District Court's finding of liability for the acquisition of
the failing company. According to Korean experts, the case will almost certainly proceed to the Supreme
Court of Korea.
31. Lawrence S. Liu, A Perspective on Corporate Governance in Taiwan, 31 ASIA Bus. L.
REv. 29, 35 (2001) [hereinafter Liu, Corporate Governance in Taiwan].
32. It was founded as the Securities and Futures Market Development Institute. The name was
changed in 1992. The discussion in the text is drawn from Liu, Simulating Securities Class Actions,
supra note 13.
33. SECURITIES AND FUTURES INSTITUTE, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 9 (2003) (hereinafter SFI
ANNUAL REPORT].
34. Id. at 15 (noting that the professional staff of eighty-nine includes one Ph.D. holder and
twenty-five M.A. degree holders, and that twenty percent of the staff has served for more than ten years).
35. Id. at 10.
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Section IV.C, it is significant that the government chose the NPO form to
extend its reach in the field of investor protection.
36
The SFI engages in both non-enforcement and enforcement activities.
Non-enforcement related activities include conducting research, taking
investor complaints, helping to settle disputes, providing legal consultation,
and promoting investor education.37 As a shareholder, SFI also participates in
shareholders meetings, particularly where a company is in financial crisis or is
issuing substantial amounts of new equity.38 Enforcement actions fall into
several categories: executing disgorgement rights for short-swing trading
profits (on grounds similar to those in Section 16 of the U.S. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934)39 and acting as agent in shareholder suits and de facto
class actions. Court costs and attorneys' fees are funded by the SFI, and in
turn by the SFI's funding sources. Thus, SFI's contributors "are willing to
subsidize the cost [of] civil enforcement.
40
Statistics indicate that the SFI has been active in its law enforcement
role. As of 2002, the SFI has filed class actions against twenty-four companies
on behalf of 9,700 investors, seeking NT$4.7 billion (about $150 million) in
civil damages.4' Since 1998, SFI has filed more than 2,000 disgorgement
actions for short-swing profits, seeking NT$8.7 billion (about $300 million). It
played a leading enforcement role in a series of major corporate scandals that
emerged in Taiwan in the late 1990s. Typically acting on behalf of hundreds
of investors, SFI sued numerous so-called "landmine companies," whose
controlling shareholders had used affiliates to manipulate stock prices and
siphon off corporate assets.42 These cases are still pending.
C. Japan
Shareholder Ombudsman, an NPO "dedicated to the goal of reforming
Japanese management practices to incorporate the views of ordinary
shareholders and citizens,, 43 was founded in 1996 by a group of lawyers,
36. Some commentators on previous drafts of this Article have expressed doubt that SFI
should be considered an NPO at all, given its close relationship to the government. But the SFI meets
both the legal and functional definition of an NPO-it is a registered nonprofit foundation under
Taiwanese law, and its members are bound by the non-distribution constraint. Moreover, close
connections between the NPO sector and the government are hardly unique to Taiwan. More
importantly from my perspective, the fact that a governmental agency utilizes a separate, "quasi-private"
organization to accomplish certain regulatory goals suggests that something distinctive about the NPO
form is missed when it is analytically lumped together with "the government." The question of why a
governmental agency would co-opt an NPO into its public goods supply chain is explored in Section
Iv.C.
37. SFI ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 33, at 17-37.
38. Id. at 33.
39. Unlike U.S. securities law, however, under the Taiwanese securities law, the corporation
must force disgorgement of such profits, and shareholders may sue if the corporation fails to do so.
40. Liu, Corporate Governance in Taiwan, supra note 31, at 36.
41. See SFI ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 33.
42. Liu, Simulating Securities Class Actions, supra note 13, at 8-12.
43. Kabunushi (Shareholders) Ombudsman, About Kabunushi (Shareholders) Ombudsman-
Its Goals and Activities, at http://wwwl.neweb.ne.jp/wa/kabuombu/english-02.htm (last visited Dec. 13,
2003).
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accountants, and academics. 4 The organization is a spin-off of the Osaka-
based Citizens' Ombudsman, a watch dog group that monitors the government
bureaucracy and the relationship between government and business. At its
founding, Shareholder Ombudsman had 150 members and a portfolio of 300
stocks. Its members were divided into three groups-shareholder members,
specialist members, and citizen members-but the core group of active
participants only numbered about fifteen.45 Given the legal nature of its work,
specialist members in the form of elite attorneys are the core of the
organization.
Although not legally established as a nonprofit organization under
Japan's Civil Code due to the onerous formation requirements in effect at the
time of its founding, Shareholder Ombudsman is organized and functions as if
its members were bound by the nondistibution constraint. a As one observer
has noted, while Shareholder Ombudsman has the legal form of a limited
liability company [vigen gaisha], the objectives stated in its charter-
exercising shareholders' legal rights, improving corporate information
disclosure, and serving as a voice for the expression of shareholder opinion-
47are public goods. Since Shareholder Ombudsman's principal weapon is the
derivative suit-an action in which compensation won by plaintiffs returns to
the corporation-the only direct economic returns available to members of the
NPO are attorneys' fees. But senior Shareholder Ombudsman attorneys
typically donate any fees to which they are entitled to the organization. Indeed,
most of the organization's operating expenses are funded by such donations.48
While junior attorneys working on successful cases do receive modest
compensation out of the attorneys' fees paid by the defendant corporation,49
this does not set Shareholder Ombudsman apart from NPOs that pay modest
salaries to their staff members.
As noted in the Introduction, Shareholder Ombudsman has been
involved in many of the high-profile shareholder derivative suits in Japan.
44. Hiroshi Otsuka, Iraishanaki Hrd5in: "Kabunushi Onbuzuman" to kabunushi daihy5
soshd [Client-less Legal Activists: "Shareholder Ombudsman" and Shareholder Derivative Suits], 47
KOBE HOGAKU ZASSHI [KOBE L. REv.] 705, 733 (1997); About Kabunushi (Shareholders) Ombudsman-
Its Goals and Activities, supra note 43.
45. Otsuka, supra note 44, at 734.
46. Id. at 736. According to lawyers involved with the organization, the nonprofit form was
not selected due to the high initial endowment requirements under the Civil Code. The Civil Code
provides for two types of nonprofit organizations: the incorporated foundation [zaidan h~jin] and the
incorporated association [shadan hdjin]. The required minimum endowment to establish an incorporated
association is *100 million (about $800,000). Moreover, nonprofits are granted legal status under the
Civil Code only at the discretion of government ministries with jurisdiction over their activities. Even if
legal status as a nonprofit is obtained, tax deductibility for contributions to such organizations is granted
only at the discretion of the Ministry of Finance. Less than three percent of the 9,000 nonprofit
organizations formed under the Civil Code have been granted tax-favored status. Yoshinori Yamaoka,
Untitled Draft, at 6 (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Journal of International Law) (2002).
In 1998, a new NPO law was enacted, providing for registration as of right to organizations that meet
specified statutory requirements. Law to Promote Specified Nonprofit Activities, Law No. 7 of 1998,
arts. 1, 2 (1998), http://www.jcie.or.jp/civilnet/civil1socmonitor/npolaw.html. The Shareholder
Ombudsman has applied for NPO status under this law.
47. Otsuka, supra note 44, at 737.
48. E-mail from Yoshihiro Yamada, an academic affiliated with Shareholder Ombudsman, to
author (Nov. 19, 2002) (on file with The Yale Journal of International Law).
49. West, supra note 5, at 369.
2004)
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 29: 169
From 1996 to 2001, according to information published by the organization,
Shareholder Ombudsman filed twelve derivative suits, including cases against
the directors of some of Japan's best known companies, such as Sumitomo
Corporation, Nomura Securities, Takashimaya Department Store, Daiichi-
Kangyo Bank, Ajinomoto, Yamaichi Securities, Japan Airlines, Kobe Steel,
and Mitsubishi Motors. 50
Although Shareholder Ombudsman has not obtained a favorable
judgment in any of its cases, it has settled at least half-a-dozen suits. These
include a Y-430 million ($4 million) settlement with the directors of Sumitomo
Corporation for unauthorized copper trading losses, a ¥310 million ($3
million) settlement with the directors of Kobe Steel for payoffs to racketeers,
and a settlement with the directors of Japan Airlines for failure to comply with
a law mandating that a certain percentage of its workforce be comprised of
disabled workers. Many of these settlements involve not only cash
reimbursements by the directors to their respective corporations, but also
commitments from the firm to establish mechanisms to prevent the conduct
from recurring. For example, the Kobe Steel settlement included a
commitment by the corporation to establish a compliance committee to
prevent future malfeasance. The Japan Airlines settlement included a
commitment to increase the employment of disabled workers over time until
the statutory requirement was met, together with the payment of a Y-40-50
million ($400,000-$500,000) fine to the government annually for an extended
period of time. Thus, some of these settlements are arguably the equivalent of
a judicial victory both in terms of compensation received-indeed, the
settlement in the Takashimaya case slightly exceeded the amount of damages
sought in the litigation-and their impact on the corporate community. The
proximity of a Shareholder Ombudsman's settlement to a victorious judgment
is particularly close in cases such as the Kobe Steel suit, in which the district
court publicly released a settlement memorandum outlining its finding of clear
violations of the duty of care and loyalty by the directors.
Apart from derivative litigation, Shareholder Ombudsman has engaged,
to a limited extent, in other activist efforts. It has directly, or through
shareholders affiliated with the group, filed shareholder proposals against
several prominent firms such as Sony and Sumitomo Bank. For example, the
Sony proposal sought disclosure of directors' individual salaries and
retirement bonuses.5 While none of the proposals has garnered sufficient
votes to be adopted, management has responded to some of the organization's
recommendations 53 Recently, for example, Shareholder Ombudsman withdrew
a shareholder proposal against a scandal-plagued food products company after
the corporation agreed to appoint an outside director nominated by a national
50. See About Kabunushi (Shareholders) Ombudsman-Its Goals and Activities, supra note
43.
51. Sosh5 no shoki shuketsu ni mukete no saibansho no shoken [The Court's Findings on
Early Termination of the Litigation], at http://wwwl.neweb.ne.jp/wa/kabuombu/koube01.htm (last
visited Dec. 13, 2003).
52. The First Year of the Shareholder's Proposals Era, at http://wwwl.neweb.ne.jp/wa/
kabuombu/020703-01.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2003).
53. About Kabunushi (Shareholders) Ombudsman-Its Goals and Activities, supra note 43.
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consumer group. 4 Shareholder Ombudsman has also made two forays into the
legislative reform process. It unsuccessfully opposed pro-management
amendments to the Commercial Code's derivative suit procedures. More
recently, it has supported passage of a whistle blower statute, which is
opposed by business groups and to date has not been enacted. Finally,
Shareholder Ombudsman has carried out campaigns to improve the
shareholder meeting process.
III. THEORY: NPOs, PUBLIC GOODS, TRUST, AND SOCIAL
ENTREPRENEURSHIP
Although the nonprofit sector has been described as the "'lost continent'
on the social landscape of modern society[,]", 55 a burgeoning literature
explores questions that closely parallel those now preoccupying scholars of
comparative corporate governance. These questions include how to account
for significant cross-country diversity in NPO size and role, and the impact of
domestic legal environments on the establishment and performance of
NPOs.56
Paralleling the theory of the firm debate in corporate literature, much
theoretical attention has been devoted to the fundamental question of why
NPOs exist. While no single theory garners universal support, one highly
persuasive theory, most closely associated with Burton Weisbrod, views
NPOs as a response to government and market failures in the supply of public
goods.57 In classical economics, market failure is of course the major
justification for government. But Weisbrod noted that in a democracy,
"government failure" is also common, since decisions about which public
goods to produce and in what quantity will most often reflect the preferences
of the median voter. The more heterogeneous the population, therefore, the
larger the unsatisfied demand for public goods. In Weisbrod's framework,
NPOs emerge to supply public goods that are not provided by the state or the
market.
The "government failure/market failure" theory generates a
straightforward hypothesis: the size of the NPO sector should vary with the
54. See The First Year of the Shareholder's Proposals Era, supra note 52.
55. LESTER M. SALAMON ET AL., SOCIAL ORIGINS OF CIVIL SOCIETY: AN OVERVIEW 1 (Johns
Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, Working Paper No. 38, 2000).
56. This literature predates the comparative corporate governance debate by a decade. See,
e.g., Estelle James, The Nonprofit Sector in Comparative Perspective, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A
RESEARCH HANDBOOK 397, 402-05 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987).
57. BURTON WEISBROD, THE VOLUNTARY NONPROFIT SECTOR (1977); Burton Weisbrod,
Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Non-Profit Sector in a Three-Sector Economy, in ALTRUISM,
MORALITY, AND ECONOMIC THEORY 171 (Edmund S. Phelps ed., 1975). See also Kim, supra note 19, at
62 ("There is, therefore, a functional logic to the emergence of NPOs as providers of goods that are
under-supplied by both the market and the government.") (citations omitted). Knowledgeable
commentators have called the "government failure/market failure" concept "the dominant theoretical
perspective in the nonprofit field until relatively recently." Lester Salamon & Helmut K. Anheier, Social
Origins of Civil Society: Explaining the Nonprofit Sector Cross-Nationally, 9 VOLUNTAS 213, 220
(1998). While this theory is still highly influential, other persuasive theories, including the "contract
failure" and "social entrepreneur" concepts, are also viewed today as important advances in the
scholarly understanding of the field. See infra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
2004)
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 29: 169
degree of heterogeneity in a given society. While by no means unchallenged
in its dominance, this theory in fact finds considerable empirical support in
cross-country studies of the non-profit sector.
58
An important extension of this theoretical linkage between NPOs and
public goods is the notion of "contract failure" developed by Henry
Hansmann.59 Hansmann noted that people are in fact willing to produce public
goods in many circumstances. However, difficulties inherent in measuring the
quality of public goods create severe information problems for consumers. In
theory, these information problems could be overcome with a sufficiently
detailed contract, but the costs of such contracting are prohibitive. The NPO-
essentially a state-supplied standard form contract imposing the non-
distribution constraint on an organization's members-economizes on the
costs of writing and enforcing a contract to ensure that consumers'
expenditures bear a relationship to the goods supplied. Put differently, the
non-distribution constraint inherent in the NPO form makes it a more
trustworthy producer of public goods than for-profit firms.6°
Influential as the foregoing theories may be, responses to the demand for
public goods are not likely the sole explanation for the emergence of NPOs. A
corollary theory focuses on the individuals who supply public goods. The
supply-side theory recognizes that the demand for public goods can be met by
NPOs only if there is a supply of people--"social entrepreneurs"--with the
qualifications and incentives to establish NPOs. As commentators note,
however, "the appearance of such individuals is not random .... It is most
likely under particular circumstances." 61 While religious competition is
typically viewed in the literature as the factor most conducive to the
emergence of social entrepreneurs (because the provision of social services is
62a way to attract new adherents to a religion), intuitively it should not be the
only such factor. Although it seems not to have received rigorous attention in
the literature, another environment that is likely to spawn social entrepreneurs
is the young democracy, particularly one that has recently emerged out of an
authoritarian regime that generated organized popular protests. Such a society
should be more likely to have a stock of trained and motivated social
entrepreneurs who received their "training" in movements against the prior
regime. As explained below, these circumstances appear to be part of the
alchemy supporting the corporate governance NPOs in Korea and Taiwan.
In addition to this theoretical work, there are close parallels in the NPO
scholarship to the influential "law and finance" work, which links the size of
capital markets and the dispersion of shareholding around the world to the
58. See, e.g., Salamon & Anheier, supra note 57, at 232-237. In the literature, heterogeneity is
measured by ethno-linguistic fractionalization. In theory, however, other forms of heterogeneity should
be equally important.
59. See Hansrarm, supra note 6, at 845.
60. Id. at 848-854.
61. Salamon & Anheier, supra note 57, at 221.
62. See, e.g., James, supra note I1, at 6; Salamon & Anheier, supra note 57, at 237-38.
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quality of domestic legal environments. 63 Just as law appears to influence the
size and financing structure of firms in the for-profit economy, so too, the
legal environment seems to influence the size and role of the nonprofit sector
around the world.64 At the most basic level, legal regimes can make it easy or
difficult to form an NPO, subject NPOs to little or intrusive governmental
oversight, and subsidize or not subsidize NPO activities through the favorable
tax treatment of donations. It also seems highly plausible that legal regimes
may affect NPO activity in a variety of other, less direct ways. For example,
speech and assembly laws may affect the supply of social entrepreneurs in
society, and levels of governmental corruption may drive demand for
alternative sources of public goods. To my knowledge, these less direct links
between law and the NPO sector have not been systematically explored in the
literature, though intuitively they appear highly plausible.
While the theories outlined above by no means explain the totality of the
nonprofit sector of the economy, 65 they do suggest that corporate law
enforcement, as a public good, could be fertile ground for NPO involvement.
This might be particularly true in a region such as East Asia, where
expectations about corporate governance, corporate performance, and the role
of the state in economic management have become more heterogeneous due to
rapid economic growth and political change; where demand for corporate law
enforcement has increased with the decline of institutional structures (such as
extensive corporate relationships with banks and governmental actors that at
one time partially substituted for formal law enforcement); and where a stock
of social entrepreneurs may have been created in Korea and Taiwan during the
recent democratization process. This is not to suggest that NPOs will always
emerge to remedy government and market failures in the supply of investor
protection (or any other public good). Indeed, theory and experience suggest
that an environment conducive to productive NPO activity is rather elusive
and highly sensitive to local social and legal conditions.
IV. APPLICATION: NPOs AS INVESTOR PROTECTION
In this part of the Article, I show that the emergence of NPOs as
suppliers of investor protection in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan is generally
consistent with key insights of the theories discussed above, helping to
unravel the puzzle of corporate law enforcement in East Asia and suggesting a
potentially more active role for NPOs in the corporate governance
environments of other countries. I wish to emphasize again the modesty of my
theoretical ambitions: I am not asserting that the theory just sketched fully
63. Raphael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) [hereinafter La
Porta et al., Law and Finance]; Raphael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J.
FIN. 1131 (1997) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Legal Determinants].
64. See, e.g., PHILANTHROPY AND LAW IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE NONPROFIT
LEGAL SYSTEMS IN TEN ASIA PACIFIC SOCIETIES (Thomas Silk ed., 1999).
65. For example, as Mel Eisenberg pointed out to me, existing theory seems impoverished in
its emphasis on government and market "failures" as the motivating impulse for the creation of NPOs.
The nonprofit sector represents a distinct form of activity, apart from governmental and market activity,
with its own reason for being.
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explains the pattern of NPO involvement in corporate law enforcement around
the world. Rather, I am suggesting that it is possible to significantly leverage
our understanding of the East Asian experience by drawing on theories
developed to explain the general phenomenon of NPOs. The discussion begins
by briefly examining the public goods attributes of corporate law enforcement,
and moves to an evaluation of specific factors in these systems that may lead
to gaps between supply and demand for this public good. It then shifts to an
analysis of several common and divergent attributes of the NPOs in East Asia
that have emerged to meet the unmet demand, and ties the differences to
diversity in local legal, historical, and political environments. The final
section evaluates-and ultimately discounts-an alternative cultural explanation
for this phenomenon.
A. Corporate Law Enforcement as a Public Good
Since the dominant theory views NPOs as a response to gaps in the
supply of public goods, the first step in our discussion is to highlight the
public goods qualities of corporate law enforcement. Indeed, corporate law
enforcement displays the classic attributes of a public good: indivisibility and
non-excludability. A shareholder's "consumption" of investor protection and
good corporate governance does not reduce the benefits available to others,
and it is not possible for the law enforcer/activist to exclude others from most
or all of the benefits conferred by his or her efforts. The shareholder derivative
suit presents the problem in its most extreme form. The plaintiff bears the cost
of the suit. But each of the firm's shareholders indirectly partakes of any
monetary award and benefits from whatever specific deterrent effect the suit
has on management.66 The shareholding public benefits to the extent that the
enforcement effort has a general deterrent effect on other corporate managers.
To the extent that the law enforcement effort results in the creation of "better"
law, the general sublic benefits from a more efficient environment for
economic activity.
In many ways, the United States and East Asia stand at opposite ends of
the spectrum in their approaches to the public goods problem of law
enforcement. As John Coffee notes, "[p]robably to a unique degree, American
law relies upon private litigants to enforce substantive provisions of law that
in other legal systems are left largely to the discretion of public enforcement
agencies." 8 This U.S. "private attorney general" model rests on procedural
rules that establish fee arrangements for plaintiffs' attorneys. These
mechanisms may lead to over-enforcement, particularly as they relate to
66. Note the somewhat different derivative suit dynamics in systems characterized by
dominant shareholders, such as Korea. There, the victorious derivative suit can be viewed as a wealth
transfer from the dominant shareholder (who may be functionally indistinguishable from the director-
defendants) to minority shareholders.
67. 2 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 12 (1994).
68. John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic
Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669,
669 (1986).
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corporate and securities law.69 In any event, they stand in sharp contrast to the
corporate law enforcement environment in East Asia, which contains
relatively weak private incentives for law enforcement.
As a crude illustration of the difference in approach, consider the
number of shareholder derivative suits filed in the United States versus the
East Asian systems. Definitive data on the number of shareholder suits in the
United States are unavailable, but all existing evidence indicates that large
numbers of suits are filed in any given year. For example, one prominent
study found that nineteen percent of a random sample of 535 publicly traded
U.S. corporations experienced derivative litigation between the late 1960s and
1987.70 By contrast, the derivative suit mechanism has never been invoked
against the directors of a public company in Taiwan, although Taiwanese
corporate law has contained a derivative suit mechanism since the mid-i 960s.
The same situation prevailed in Korea until 1997. Since then a handful of suits
(about twelve) has been filed, 71 but the number remains low, particularly
considering the major corporate governance problems of Korean firms
exposed by the Asian financial crisis. 72 Japan averaged about one derivative
suit every two years for the first forty years in which its derivative suit
mechanism was in place, until a procedural change in 1993 lowered
enforcement costs. Since that time, there has been a modest explosion of
shareholder litigation, with more than 500 suits filed.73
The incidence of derivative litigation is by no means a perfect measure
of corporate law enforcement and the quality of investor protection in a given
system. Indeed, for reasons explored in depth by Roberta Romano, many
derivative suits have more to do with attorney incentives than investor
protection.74 Yet the incidence of derivative litigation in a given system is at
least one objective measure of the extent to which shareholders' rights are
exercised, and this measure seems to correlate with a broader range of
available evidence on law enforcement in the various countries. 75 This
comparison, though crude, lends support to the common perception that the
United States and East Asia have adopted quite different approaches to the
public goods problem inherent in corporate law enforcement. The Japanese
69. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 55, 55-56 (1991).
70. Id. at 58-59.
71. This is a consensus estimate provided to the author by several Korean corporate law
scholars.
72. It is not clear why the number of derivative suits in Korea has remained so small in
comparison to Japan, particularly given that the two countries now have similar procedural
environments for derivative litigation. See infra Section IV.B.1.
73. This figure is supported by unpublished data provided to the author by the Supreme Court
of Japan. Two points about the Japanese data: first, they suggest that, to a greater extent than SFI or
PSPD in their respective jurisdictions, Shareholder Ombudsman has some competition for its role in
corporate law enforcement in Japan. Second, they suggest that transaction costs arising out of the
institutional environment, rather than amorphous cultural factors, account for the disparities between the
East Asian systems and the United States. Once the transaction costs of filing suit in Japan were reduced,
resort to "U.S.-style" enforcement mechanisms increased markedly.
74. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 69; West, supra note 5.
75. See, e.g., West, supra note 5, at 379-80 (noting that increasing rates of derivative litigation
post-1993 correlate with increased prosecution of white collar crime).
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data, showing a pronounced spike in the incidence of shareholder litigation
upon the lowering of filing fees, suggest that enforcement costs and related
obstacles, rather than cultural values, dampen corporate law enforcement in
the region. These conclusions are developed in the next two sections of the
Article.
B. Corporate Law Enforcement in East Asia: Demand and Supply
Though difficult to measure precisely, demand for investor protection
has increased substantially in Korea, Taiwan, and Japan over the past half
decade. The single most important reason for this shift in demand has been the
Asian financial crisis, because poor corporate governance practices are widely
seen as a major contributing factor to the crisis. 76 In countries such as Korea,
investor protection received virtually no attention prior to the outbreak of the
crisis, but it became a leading public policy concern thereafter. While Taiwan
escaped the Asian financial crisis relatively unscathed (largely due to macro-
economic differences between it and the crisis countries), it encountered a
spate of serious corporate scandals at the end of the 1990s, which had the
equivalent effect of exposing serious problems in corporate shareholding
structures and managerial oversight mechanisms. In Japan, a decade of
economic malaise and a long series of problems in the corporate and financial
sectors have made corporate governance reform a leading topic. Expectations
toward corporate governance and investor protection have also changed as the
constellation of shareholders in these countries has shifted. Both foreign
institutional investment and foreign direct investment in the region have
increased substantially over the past five years, bringing with them new
perspectives on the proper goals and behavior of corporate management.
77
Governments in all three countries have responded to this increase in
demand with a host of corporate and securities law revisions, many of which
were designed to improve the position of minority shareholders. For example,
minimum ownership thresholds or fees for exercising certain shareholders
rights were lowered, and the fiduciary duties of directors were made more
explicit. Yet despite considerable reform of corporate law, as the analysis
below indicates, corporate law enforcement remains somewhat problematic,
suggesting that gaps remain between demand for and supply of investor
protection.
Before surveying the principal impediments to more active corporate
law enforcement in East Asia, it is useful to note that the three systems share a
common legal tradition. Japan transplanted basic features of the continental
civil law tradition, most notably the German system, into its legal system at
the end of the nineteenth century. As a result, Japan's Company Law, part of
the Commercial Code, bears many structural similarities to the German
Commercial Code. Moreover, the basic features of its judicial and civil
76. Simon Johnson et al., Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis, 58 J. FIN.
ECON. 141 (2000).
77. On Japan, see Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, Institutional Change and M&A in
Japan: Diversity Through Deals, in GLOBAL MARKETS, supra note 4, at 295.
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litigation systems are familiar to anyone trained in the civil law tradition.
Through colonization in the early twentieth century, Japan substantially
influenced the legal systems of Korea and Taiwan. Thus, with (increasingly
prevalent) system-specific variations, one encounters across the three
jurisdictions basic similarities in the structure of the judiciary and the legal
profession, the procedural environment for civil litigation, and the overall
"approach" of the Company Law to investor protection. As a result, one finds
(with some variation in specifics and acuteness) common impediments to
private law enforcement in the corporate area, including high standing
thresholds, lack of access to information, and procedural rules that may
discourage would-be plaintiffs. As a result, whether inadvertently or by design,
most enforcement efforts fall to the state.
1. High Statutory Thresholds and Economic Risk
High shareholding thresholds for the exercise of important shareholder
rights and the significant economic risks of filing suit have historically been
major obstacles to shareholder activism in East Asia. In both Korea and
Taiwan, until recently, minority shareholders had to collectively own 5% of
the outstanding shares to file a derivative suit. Given the average market
capitalization of listed companies in Korea as of 1997, for example, this
requirement meant that minority shareholders had to hold, in the aggregate,
over 3 billion won ($3.5 million) in shares to file a derivative action.. Post-
Asian financial crisis corporate law reforms in Korea reduced that threshold to
0.01% for listed firms. 7 9 Recent Taiwanese reforms lowered the threshold to
3% of the outstanding shares held continuously for one year, but this still
poses a formidable barrier to obtaining standing. 8° By contrast, standing is not
a problem in Japan, where only a single share, held continuously for six
months, is required to file a derivative suit.
81
Beyond meeting standing thresholds to bring suit, plaintiffs need access
to corporate information in order to build a case against management. In all
three systems, the corporate law poses a high bar to plaintiffs. In Japan, 3% of
the voting rights are needed to inspect corporate accounts and records and to
appoint an inspector to examine corporate affairs and records. 82 The same
thresholds were in effect in Korea until 1997, although they have been
reduced for publicly held firms through recent reforms. While 3% of the
outstanding shares are still required to appoint an inspector (1.5% for
specified large companies), holders of 0.1% of the outstanding shares are now
entitled to inspect books and records of public companies (0.05% for specified
large companies).83 In Taiwan, holders of 3% of the shares may appoint an
inspector.
78. Kim & Kim, Revamping Fiduciary Duties, supra note 4, at 386.
79. Securities and Exchange Act, art. 191-13(1) (2002) (S. Korea).
80. Company Law, art. 214 (2001) (Taiwan).
81. SHOHO [COMMERCIAL CODE] art. 267 (Japan).
82. Id. arts. 237(3), 293-6 (Japan).
83. Securities and Exchange Act, art. 191-13(3), 191-13(5) (2002) (S. Korea).
84. Company Law, art. 245 (2001) (Taiwan).
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The cost and attendant financial risks of filing suit can also pose
obstacles to derivative litigation in all three systems. In Japan, until a 1993
amendment fixed the fee at a nominal amount, most courts interpreted a
procedural statute to require that plaintiffs in derivative suits pay a filing fee
on a sliding scale based on the amount of damages sought. According to this
scale, a $10 million claim against management, for example, would require a
filing fee of $25,00085-a fee that was forfeited if the plaintiffs lost. As
discussed above, revision of the filing fee touched off a small explosion of
derivative litigation in Japan. 86 Even today, however, upon the defendant's
motion, plaintiffs in derivative suits may be required to post a bond for
expenses, a requirement that was eliminated from most state corporate laws in
the United States because it chilled both frivolous and meritorious suits. In
cases in which the Japanese courts have granted the motion, the bond has
averaged about $1.5 million, virtually the equivalent of a dismissal of the
suit.
87
In Taiwan, the financial risks of derivative litigation are even more
severe.88 Plaintiffs must advance 1% of the claim as a filing fee at the district
court level, and 1.5% at both the appellate court and the court of last resort.
89
As in Japan, the loser pays court costs plus his own attorneys' fees. Thus,
even if enough minority shareholders could be assembled to meet the 3%
threshold for filing suit, they face the risk of huge out-of-pocket loss-up to
3.5% of the damages sought plus their attorneys' fees-if they ultimately lose
the case.
Filing fees and court costs pose less of an obstacle to derivative
litigation in Korea. Korean procedural law has always set the filing fee in
derivative suits at a nominal amount, consistent with current Japanese law.
And while Korean courts, like courts in Japan and Taiwan, are empowered to
order that the plaintiff post a bond for expenses, they have not done so in the
small number of derivative suits filed to date. In Korea, the losing party pays
court costs including attorneys' fees, but only up to a nominal amount
determined by a formula. 90 Given the low fees, it is not clear why the number
of shareholder derivative suits in Korea has remained small following the
drastic lowering of ownership thresholds for filing suit. Perhaps the
information and access problems discussed in the next section remain
sufficient to dampen litigation.
85. West, supra note 5, at 355.
86. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
87. West, supra note 5, at 355.
88. Liu, Corporate Governance in Taiwan, supra note 31.
89. These fees were recently increased to 1.1% and 1.65%, respectively.
90. SuP. CT. R. 758 (Korea). However, both the Commercial Code and the Securities and
Exchange Act allow successful derivative suit plaintiffs to recover actual attorneys' fees from the
corporation. This rule obviously has no bearing on the plaintiffs calculation of downside risk in the
event he loses the case.
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2. Weak Infrastructure for Private Law Enforcement
Civil enforcement of corporate and securities cases in all three countries
is hampered by several features common to all legal systems in the civil law
tradition: the lack of a formal discovery system to aid the production of
evidence, the absence of class action procedures to overcome collective action
problems in litigation, and limited remedies for breach of fiduciary duty. All
of these factors contribute to diminishing the incentives to file suit. These
features of the procedural landscape for civil litigation are exacerbated by the
structure of the legal profession in the three systems. The population of judges
is low by comparative standards (see Table 1), leading to significant delay in
clearing cases, at least in Taiwan. Equally significantly, the judiciary is
organized as a career bureaucracy, with the only major point of entry at the
bottom. This results in a dearth of judges with professional experience in
corporate law or white collar crime. Judges unfamiliar with business practices,
particularly those operating in the more code-bound civil law tradition, are
more likely to avoid breaking new doctrinal ground in identifying unlawful
conduct and fashioning flexible remedies to address contemporary corporate
governance issues.
The infrastructure for private law enforcement is further constrained by
low lawyer populations in general (see Table 1), small numbers of attorneys
who specialize in corporate and securities law in particular, and a lack of high-
powered incentive compensation mechanisms for attorneys to seek out worthy
plaintiffs in corporate and securities cases.
91
TABLE 1: COMPARATIVE LEGAL POPULATIONS
92
United States England France Germany Japan Korea Taiwan
Lawyers 906,611 80,868 29,395 85,105 16,398 4,300 3,900
Per 100,000 339.87 154.89 50.15 103.77 13.0 9.45 18.13
Population
Judges 30,888 3,170 4,900 20,999 2,093 1,400 1,607
Per 100,000 11.6 6.07 8.4 25.6 1.7 3.07 7.47
Population
3. Tradition of Shareholder Passivity
Although the situation is beginning to change, shareholding patterns in
all three systems have not been conducive to shareholder activism, either at
91. Cf Coffee, supra note 68, at 669-70 ("[The key legal rules that make the private attorney
general a reality in America today . . . are not substantive but procedural-namely, those rules that
establish the fee arrangements under which these plaintiff's attorneys are compensated.").
92. Data for the United States, England, France, Germany, and Japan are as of 1997, and are
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/pre21/l6.gif (last visited Dec. 15, 2003). Korean data are as of 2000
and can be found in Jae Won Kim, The Ideal and the Reality of the Korean Legal Profession, 2 ASIAN-
PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 45, 46 (2001). Taiwan data are as of 2002 and were provided to the author by the
Taiwan Bar Association and the Judicial Yuan.
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the individual or institutional level. In Korea and Taiwan, family-affiliated
conglomerates play a major role in the economy. Founders and their families
exercise disproportionate control over group firms through pyramidal share
ownership structures. In Japan, although the distinct identities of keiretsu
93
corporate networks have been diluted and cross-shareholding among keiretsu
group firms is declining, management threatened by an unwelcome advance
can still mobilize friendly shareholder networks to fend off a challenger-as
recent episodes of shareholder activism in Japan have demonstrated.
94
Concentrated ownership may reflect the weak legal protections for minority
95shareholders in civil law-style commercial codes. Conversely, the law may
not have developed stronger investor protections because relational
shareholding patterns among affiliated firms reduced the need for them.
Domestic institutional investors thus far have not played a significant
role in corporate governance in any of the three countries. This is a simple
reflection of the identities and goals of the investors. As commentators have
noted, for example, in Korea, "most domestic institutional investors are direct
affiliates of the chaebol or rely upon them for business, and thus remain
captive and passive monitors." 6 Similarly in Japan, most domestic
institutional investors place priority on maintaining reciprocal business
relationships over increasing shareholder value. They vote, but rarely
coordinate with other institutional investors on corporate governance issues,
make shareholder proposals, release focus lists, or engage in other efforts to
improve performance at portfolio firmS. 97 In Taiwan, there is less room for
institutional investor activism because the stock market is dominated by
individual investors. 98 Even where institutional investors do take stakes in
portfolio firms, as in the other two countries, they play a passive role in
corporate governance.
Given these shareholding patterns and the passivity of institutional
investors, shareholder discipline in the form of the market for corporate
control is virtually nonexistent in the three systems. By comparison, in the
United States, takeovers are one of the main contexts in which shareholders
93. The term keiretsu describes a group of affiliated companies typically organized around a
single bank.
94. For example, institutional investors with stable shareholding and business ties to a firm
called Tokyo Style gave unconditional support to management in a high profile proxy fight initiated by
the firm's largest shareholder. The support of these institutional shareholders allowed management to
defeat the unwelcome advance. See Institutions Threaten Corporate Governance, NIKKEI WKLY., July
22, 2002, 2002 WL 25813719.
95. This is the principal finding of an influential line of empirical research. See, e.g., La Porta
et al., Law and Finance, supra note 63.
96. Kim & Kim, Revamping Fiduciary Duties, supra note 4, at 377.
97. See KOICHI AKAISHI, KIKAN TOSHIKA NO KOPOREETO GABANANSU KATSUDO NO IGI-
WAGA KUNI NO KIKAN TOSHIKA WA KOKATEKI NA GABANANSU KATSUDO GA DEKIRU KA [THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ACTIVITIES BY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS: CAN
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN OUR COUNTRY PLAY AN EFFECTIVE ROLE?] (2002) (unpublished report, on
file with The Yale Journal of International Law).
98. As of 2001, domestic institutional investors accounted for less than ten percent of the
market by trading volume. Jaw Chyuan Chu, The Taiwan Securities Market, Address Before the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Fourth Round Table on Capital Market
Reform in Asia (Apr. 9-10, 2002).
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exercise rights, and one of the main vehicles for the creation of law on
directors' fiduciary duties. 99
4. Constraints on State Enforcement
Given this litany of obstacles to private enforcement of corporate law,
criminal prosecution has had to play the leading role in all three systems.
Indeed, piggybacking on public enforcement has often been the only realistic
means of obtaining the information necessary to pursue private litigation.
00
Yet heavy reliance on state enforcement of corporate and securities law via
the criminal justice system and regulatory authorities can be problematic. At
the most basic level, corruption and political favoritism remain obstacles to
vigorous criminal and regulatory enforcement in Korea and Taiwan.
01
Moreover, the deterrent effect of criminal prosecution is diluted by the fact
that trials in Taiwan are drawn out, and in Korea, convicted white collar
criminals are frequently granted amnesties by political leaders.102 While
prosecutorial and judicial corruption is rare in Japan, more subtle factors
diminish the effectiveness of state enforcement. For example, it is common
for convicted white collar criminals to receive suspended sentences.
1 03
Recently, courts have justified these light sentences on the theory that
corporate fraud of the type conducted by the defendant managers was
widespread in the Japanese business community at the time the offense
occurred. 0 4 While justifiable on some levels from an equity perspective, these
99. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)
(finding directorial duty to auction the company to highest bidder in certain circumstances); Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (finding breach of duty of care in takeover context); Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (subjecting defensive measures to enhanced
judicial scrutiny in light of directors' inherent conflict of interest in takeover situations).
100. Kim & Kim, Revamping Fiduciary Duties, supra note 4, at 390 (stating that the first
derivative suit in Korean history was only possible because shareholder plaintiffs had access to
information produced in criminal investigation); Liu, Corporate Governance in Taiwan, supra note 31,
at 35 (noting that in Taiwan, court fees are also waived in piggyback cases); West, supra note 5, at 377-
380.
101. See, e.g., Jong-Sup Chong, Political Power and Constitutionalism, in RECENT
TRANSFORMATIONS IN KOREAN LAW AND SOCIETY 11, 25 (Dae-Kyu Yoon ed., 2000) ("Law
enforcement organs are still subservient to political power. Political decisions give great influence to
judicial interpretations."). A senior Taiwanese securities regulator publicly acknowledges that
"compliance with law is often influenced by political relationships. Enterprises having good
relationships with political parties have more leverage to avoid compliance with regulations." Chi-Hsien
Lee, Corporate Governance in Taiwan: Recent Developments in Government Policy-A View from
Government 18 (Nov. 2, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Journal of International
Law).
102. See, e.g., Chong, supra note 101.
103. Indeed, in 2000, suspended sentences accounted for almost ninety-four percent of the
verdicts of imprisonment without forced labor. Foreign Press Center/Japan, Japan: A Web Guide-
Courts & Police, at http://www.fpcj.jp/e/shiryo/pocket/courts/courts.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2003).
For a recent example, see Yukijirushi (Snow Brand), 1113 HANREI TAIMUZu 284 (Kobe Chisai
Saibansho [Dist. Ct.], Nov. 22, 2002) [hereinafter Snow Brand case] (handing down two-year suspended
sentences to employees for defrauding government subsidy program by mislabeling products).
104. For example, in the Snow Brand case, supra note 103, five former corporate officials
pleaded guilty in connection with a major food mislabeling scheme, public disclosure of which
destroyed their firm. They received suspended two-year prison terms because the court found that while
the defendants engaged in a "vicious crime that abused [the subsidy program] and betrayed people's
trust," it had been a long-standing practice in the industry to falsify product information. Snow Officials
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lenient sentencing practices, like the amnesties in Korea, significantly dilute
the deterrent effect of prosecution.
C. Explaining Cross-Country Diversity in NPO Shareholder Activism
The three shareholder activist organizations described above share two
important traits. First, though bound-either legally in the case of PSPD and
the SFI, or voluntarily in the case of Shareholder Ombudsman-by the non-
distribution constraint, all three organizations have overcome financial
incentive problems to play a noteworthy role in the corporate governance
environments of their home countries. Even in the absence of significant
financial incentives, busy, talented professionals in all three systems have
organized themselves into firms designed to produce public goods.
10 5
Discerning the motives of individuals operating within the non-distribution
constraint is obviously difficult. An NPO is an interest group by another name,
and critics of these groups see dark motives at work, such as political ambition,
hidden financial rewards, careerist maneuvering, and even betrayal of national
interests.106 Some of these motives cannot be discounted; for example, the
Korean leader of PSPD's shareholder rights group has become widely known
through his activities, and lawyers may be lured to these organizations
principally by the experience, media attention, and networking opportunities
provided by the cases they bring. It is even plausible that lawyers working for
these organizations are engaged in a kind of "loss leader" activity, creating a
domestic climate conducive to derivative litigation so that they can capture the
market for this legal work in the future.10 7 It is virtually impossible to discern
whether and to what extent "selfish" motives may be at work among the
individuals involved in these NPOs. But other motives seem plainly to be at
work as well, including altruism (in the form of a strong desire to reform
negative aspects of one's society) and anger (directed at widespread,
unpunished wrongdoing by powerful individuals and organizations). It seems
unlikely that these groups could have attained the respect they enjoy among
professionals at home and abroad if selfish motives predominated. And
regardless of underlying motives, the net effect of these organizations'
activities on the corporate governance environments of their home
jurisdictions appears positive, though admittedly the precise effect is
Get Suspended Terms, JAPAN TIMES, Nov. 23, 2002, http://www.japantimes.co/jp/cgi-
bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20021123a3.htm.
105. As one commentator notes of the Japanese group, "since 'Shareholder Ombudsman'
effectively has no client for its activities, without strong personal incentives to participate on the part of
attorneys, the organization could not have been formed." Otsuka, supra note 44, at 709-10.
106. For example, PSPD and the leader of its shareholder rights' movement have been
castigated in some segments of the Korean media as out to overturn the country's capitalist system. See
Boog-Kyu Lee, Don Quixote or Robin Hood?: Minority Shareholder Rights and Corporate Governance
in Korea, 15 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 345, 347 (2002). Shareholder Ombudsman's case selection has been
criticized, and critics occasionally make comparisons between the group and the Japanese racketeers
known to seek payoffs in return for not disrupting shareholders meetings.
107. This possibility was suggested to me by Eric Talley.
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impossible to measure. 108 Some people do appear willing to produce public
goods, at least in tandem with the pursuit of selfish motives.
Second, all three organizations use the legal system of their home
country-specifically, the domestic corporate and securities laws-as the
primary tool for the advancement of their objectives. This is significant
because it sets these groups apart from other corporate governance-oriented
NPOs, which either tend to focus on broad social issues such as the
environment or largely confine their activities to information gathering and
analysis. It is also significant because all three systems, to a greater or lesser
degree, have been characterized in the contemporary corporate governance
literature as having comparatively weak investor protections and enforcement
regimes tied to their shared civil law origin. 109 Indeed, as this Part has shown,
there is evidence to support such a characterization. Yet despite-or perhaps,
more accurately, in the face of-these weaknesses, motivated individuals have
organized firms between the interstices of public and private action to enforce
these laws, warts and all.
These common traits, however, mask substantial differences in the
formal structure, strategy, and limitations of the three NPOs in their home
countries. The origin of this diversity can be traced directly to the distinctive
legal, social, and historical environments in which they emerged. Consistent
with supply-side theories surveyed in Part III, legal and other environments
vary in their receptiveness to the NPO form, and are not equally conducive to
the production of the social entrepreneurs who establish and run NPOs.
By way of example, it is instructive to compare PSPD with Shareholder
Ombudsman, since the two groups have generally similar objectives. PSPD
has over 12,000 members with an annual budget of almost $1.5 million
(funded almost entirely out of membership dues), and a professional staff of
fifty.110 The PEC (the operational arm of PSPD engaged in shareholder
activism) has three full-time paid staff members and about twenty volunteers.
PSPD pursues a national agenda of chaebol reform. Toward that end, it has
created a list of target companies on which to focus its efforts, hoping to make
an example of Korea's best known firms. As part of this national agenda,
PSPD actively pursues legislative reform, including the enactment of a class
action mechanism for securities cases, through lobbying efforts. Moreover,
PSPD has consciously attempted to co-opt foreign institutional investors into
its program, using proxy fights and international road shows to advance and
publicize its cause. And, as noted above, PSPD is associated with two historic
108. Several readers suggested that I compare cases brought by the NPOs to those brought by
for-profit law firms to discern the motives of the NPOs. Based upon such a review, the cases brought by
the NPOs in Korea and Japan are arguably comparatively "high profile" cases. (I was unable to make a
comparison for Taiwan.) Even if accurate, however, this conclusion does not lead to unambiguous
conclusions about underlying motives. It could be that NPO members are publicity seekers. It also could
be that the high profile nature of the cases made them particularly suitable for their deterrent and
precedent-setting effects.
109. See La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note 63; La Porta et al., Law and Finance,
supra note 63.
110. People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, About PSPD,
http://www.pspd.org/pspd/about/about.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2003).
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court victories, one of which came at the expense of the chairman and
managers of one of Korea's most famous firms. Itr
Two related characteristics of PSPD help account for its visibility,
aggressiveness, and success. First, in many respects PSPD is the nonprofit
equivalent of the chaebol it is fighting-large, highly diversified, closely
associated with its founding members, and highly attuned to national
politics.112 Its leadership consciously avoids localized issues so as to minimize
internal conflicts and to pursue its cause at the center of power-the national
government and the largest business organizations. 113 Second, PSPD, like
other major civic groups in Korea, traces its lineage directly to protest
movements against past military governments. Some of the leaders of these
groups, now lawyers or other professionals in their thirties and forties, were
once student activists jailed for their fight against military rule.' 14 Thus, PSPD
and the larger civil movement of which it is a leading member were born
directly out of social cleavages resulting from rapid economic growth under
authoritarian regimes! 15 As one commentator notes: "Long lasting authoritarian
rule produced many dissidents who are advocates of public issues. As
authoritarian rule receded, many activists pursued specific public interests in
civic organizations .... The inauguration of the first civilian government in
the early 1990s provided a fertile milieu for active civil movements.'41 6 Today,
the Korean government actively supports NPOs. Indeed, PSPD is eligible for
government funding, but declines to accept it so as not to cloud its
independence.
117
Japan's Shareholder Ombudsman, by contrast, was formed in a very
different climate for social entrepreneurship. Unlike Korea, Japan has limited
national experience with large, independent activist groups, partly the result of
"one of the most severe regulatory environments [for NPOs] in the developed
world." 118 This regulatory environment has provided incentives for the
development of organizations that are small and local in nature, while
hobbling the development of large, professional civic groups. Historically, this
111. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
112. The Secretary General of the PSPD has noted the criticism of his organization as a
"department store" seeking to monopolize a wide range of issues. Won Soon Park, NGO Development in
Korea, 15 SONGKONGHAE DAEBAK NONCHONG [SONGKONGHAE UNIV. J.] 49, 75 n.26 (2000). PSPD
focuses its activities on the national government due to the highly centralized nature of government in
Korea. See Won Soon Park, The Role of NGOs in Transition-Centering on the People's Solidarity for
Participatory Democracy (PSPD) (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Journal of
International Law).
113. Interview with Won Soon Park, legal activist and co-founder of PSPD, and Kyong-Whan
Alm, academic affiliated with PSPD, in Seoul, South Korea (Sept. 24-25, 2002).
114. Laxmi Nakarmi, The Power of the NGOs, ASIAWEEK, Feb. 11, 2000, at 28.
115. INCHOON KIM & CHANGSOON HWANG, DEFINING THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: KOREA 3-4
(Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, Working Paper No. 41, 2002).
116. Dae-Kyu Yoon, Legal Aid and Public Interest Lawyering, in RECENT TRANSFORMATIONS
IN KOREAN LAW AND SOCIETY 377, 383 (Dae-Kyu Yoon ed., 2000).
117. E-mail from Joongi Kim, academic affiliated with PSPD, to author (Mar. 17, 2003) (on
file with The Yale Journal of International Law); Comments from Hasung Jang, academic who leads the
shareholder protection activities of PSPD, in Tokyo (Jan. 8, 2003).
118. ROBERT PEKKANEN, AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN JAPAN 18-19 (Nonprofit Sector Res. Fund, Working Paper
Series, Spring 2001).
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dichotomy reflects a conscious policy decision to limit the scope of NPO
activities so that citizen efforts are not diverted from the pursuit of
governmentally chosen goals.
119
A close evaluation of Shareholder Ombudsman reveals this pattern. As
noted above, at the time it was formed, Shareholder Ombudsman could not
meet the financial requirement for establishment as a nonprofit membership
organization [shadan h6jin] under the Civil Code. 12 As a result, it was
organized as a limited liability company [yfigen gaisha]. Yet this
organizational form has clear disadvantages for a civic organization. Legally,
a limited liability company may have no more than fifty members, 21 so most
of Shareholder Ombudsman's membership is informal. As a for-profit entity
in the eyes of the law, it is not eligible for tax-favored status or government
subsidies. As a legal matter, its members are not bound by the non-distribution
constraint, a fact which may diminish the trust it enjoys among potential
members and the public as a whole. Moreover, Shareholder Ombudsman's
strategy is quite "localized," at least in comparison to PSPD's national agenda.
As one affiliated academic explained, the goal of Shareholder Ombudsman is
not to "make law," or to directly change society, but to improve management
one firm at a time. 122 This may explain why Shareholder Ombudsman has
chosen to settle most of its cases. Under a one-company-at-a-time strategy,
obtaining commitments from target management to rectify their practices may
be more important, and certainly less resource-intensive, than obtaining a
judgment in court. All of these factors may account for the relatively low
profile of Shareholder Ombudsman in Japan's corporate governance
environment, notwithstanding the organization's considerable activities.
In Taiwan, as in Korea, the activist social environment and nascent
democracy have been conducive to the mobilization of civil society. Yet
Taiwan's SFI reflects a distinct approach to NPOs and the supply of public
goods. It is a creative partnership between the public and private sectors,
reflecting a conscious government strategy:
Since martial law ended in 1985, . . t]he government especially welcomed the
establishment of foundations, viewing them as social resources ready to aid in
government functions of delivering services and distributing resources to society....
The current legal framework reflects a cooperative approach on the part of government,
by which it intends to become involved in the goals, operations, and supervision of
NPOs.
123
The collaborative effort between the state and an NPO to provide investor
protection provides an illustration of the "contract failure" theory, with a
novel twist. Recall that this theory posits that NPOs exist to provide goods or
119. Id.
120. See supra note 46.
121. Yogen gaisha h6 [Limited Liability Company Law], Law No. 74 of 1938, art. 8.
122. E-mail from Yoshihiro Yamada, Lecturer, Takayama Keizai University, and Masafumi
Nakahigashi, Assistant Professor, Nagoya University, to author (Nov. 19, 2002) (on file with The Yale
Journal of International Law). Mr. Yamada is affiliated with Shareholder Ombudsman.
123. Joyce Yen Feng, Taiwan, in PHILANTHROPY AND LAW IN ASIA 315, 326-27 (Thomas Silk
ed., 1999).
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services whose quality or quantity is difficult for consumers to evaluate. The
theory predicts that where such information asymmetries are great, consumers
turn to NPOs as trustworthy producers of public goods. But as the SFI
illustrates, the government may also turn to NPOs to overcome asymmetric
information and trust problems. 124 The NPO form provides a "layer of
insulation" between the government and politically or technically problematic
enforcement efforts. 2 5 At the most basic level, the measurement problems
inherent in the supply of investor protection services renders the SFI (bound
by the non-distribution constraint) superior to a contract with a local law firm
to locate and organize worthy plaintiffs in securities and corporate fraud cases.
More importantly, perhaps, trust in the NPO form among market participants
provides the government leeway to expand its enforcement efforts into the
civil enforcement realm by co-opting the SFI into its investor protection
agenda, and obtaining private sector funding for those enforcement efforts.
The limitations of the SFI in fulfilling its mission seem largely unrelated
to the domestic NPO environment. Rather, the costs and risks inherent in
Taiwanese litigation discussed above have limited its potential as a deterrent
device. One example is the Hua Loong case, which involved a straightforward
question: is an insider who bought common stock and sold convertible
preferred shares within the statutorily prescribed period captured by the short-
swing trading disgorgement rules? 126 The SFI hesitated to pursue this "certain
victory" in court because filing suit required payment of a NT$10 million
($300,000) fee. If SFI had lost the case despite its optimistic assessment of the
merits, its endowment would have been devastated. Ultimately, SFI filed suit
and won, but the episode shows the impact of procedural rules on enforcement
decisions.
127
To address these issues, a Securities and Futures Investor Protection
Law was passed in 2001.128 The most interesting feature of the law is that it is
designed principally to enhance the enforcement capabilities of the SFI. In
that sense, it serves as a powerful political endorsement of the SFI's role in
corporate governance. It authorizes the establishment of an Investors
Protection Foundation (IPF) to take over the investor protection service of SFI
in a stand-alone foundation. 129 The Foundation's endowment will be funded
by mandatory contributions from securities and futures companies, as well as
the stock and futures exchanges.' 30 The IPF is prohibited from seeking
compensation for its litigation activities on behalf of investors,' 3 1 thereby
reinforcing the non-distribution constraint. The law also provides several
124. NPO scholar Estelle James anticipated this twist on the contract failure theory long ago.
See James, supra note 11, at 7.
125. See Michael Krashinsky, Stakeholder Theories of the Non-Profit Sector: One Cut at the
Economic Literature, 8 VOLUNTAS 149, 155 (1997).
126. In re Hua Loong, Inc., Selected Judgments of the Major Cases Violating the Securities
and Exchange Law, Vol. 2, July, 1995, at 103 (Taiwan High Court, 1993).
127. Interview with Chi-Hsien Lee, Commissioner, Taiwan Securities and Futures
Commission, in Taipei, Taiwan (Oct. 16, 2002).
128. Securities and Futures Investor Protection Law (2001) (Taiwan).
129. Id. art 18.
130. Id.
131. Id.art.33.
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advantages to the IPF in litigation. Courts are instructed to waive the security
for expenses bond posting requirement in motions for provisional relief. 132 In
the calculation of court fees, the amount of investor claims serving as the basis
of calculation will be deemed not to exceed NT$ 100 million ($3.3 million).,
33
This reduces the required filing fee and limits the court fees payable upon a
final adverse judgment. Securities regulatory officials anticipate that, with
these more favorable procedural rules, IPF will have a general deterrent effect




The "government failure/market failure" theory helps explain why NPOs
have spontaneously emerged in all three countries to address gaps in the
supply of investor protection and corporate law enforcement. NPOs as
providers of investor protection appear to have emerged (in the case of the
Korean PSPD and Japan's Shareholder Ombudsman) and become very active
(in the case of Taiwan's SFI) at this particular time for a simple reason: the
demand for investor protection has increased significantly in Korea, Taiwan,
and Japan in the past half decade, due to the Asian financial crisis, domestic
scandals, stock market declines, and the more heterogeneous expectations of
investors. These factors have coincided with the gradual demise of the
postwar institutional structure for corporate governance (featuring heavy bank
and government involvement in corporate finance) and have led to increased
awareness of investor protection and corporate law enforcement as significant
policy issues. Despite significant corporate law reform in each of these
countries, neither government nor market mechanisms have fully responded to
the increase in demand for "good" corporate governance, particularly in the
form of robust enforcement. While corporate and securities law reforms have
plainly improved the position of minority investors in these countries, the
surrounding legal infrastructure remains relatively plaintiff-unfriendly in these
cases. Moreover, there appears to be considerable public antipathy in the three
systems toward allowing lawyers to play a larger role (at least for profit) in the
resolution of economic problems. The emergence of corporate law-related
NPOs in Korea, Taiwan, and Japan at this time also coincides with a surge in
public interest in the NPO form as a tool of social and economic governance
in all three countries, the end of authoritarian rule in Taiwan and Korea, and
the deregulatory movement in Japan. In such an environment, the NPO is a
brilliant-if partial and perhaps transitory-response to the public goods
problem of corporate law enforcement.
Additionally, complementary strands of NPO theory and scholarship
may help to explain why the common experience of NPO shareholder
132. Id. art. 36.
133. Id. art. 35.
134. Interview with Chi-Hsien Lee, supra note 127. A prominent corporate practitioner and
scholar in Taiwan is more skeptical about the foundation's ability to substitute for a more plaintiff-
friendly procedural environment. E-mail from Lawrence Liu, Attorney, Lee & Li, to author (Dec. 10,
2002) (on file with The Yale Journal of International Law).
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activism in the region has taken quite different forms in the three systems. For
example, as noted above, the "contract failure" theory-applied to
governmental rather than consumer demand-may help explain the unique
role of a government-supported NPO in Taiwan's investor protection
environment. This role is consistent with Taiwan's approach to government-
third sector relations. More generally, differences in the political and legal
climate for social entrepreneurship appear to account for some of the basic
differences in organizational forms, strategies, and successes of the three
organizations in their respective countries, and are particularly illuminating in
understanding differences between PSPD and Shareholder Ombudsman. The
differences among the three organizations are generally consistent with
literature on both nonprofit and for-profit firms indicating that legal and
underlying political differences create cross-country diversity in
organizational structure and affect the supply or temperament of social
entrepreneurs.
E. Culture as an Alternative Explanation?
Is there an alternative, cultural explanation for the emergence of this
form of shareholder activism in three East Asian countries? These societies
are commonly perceived to be homogeneous, and to share important religious
(Buddhist) and philosophical (Confucian) traditions-traditions, it is often
said, which downplay the assertion of legal rights and individual
empowerment.135 If the recent mobilization of the NPO form to enhance
investor protection is an artifact of "Asian" culture, then the experience may
not be replicable elsewhere.
While I do not claim that the economic theories discussed above account
completely for the NPO phenomenon in East Asia, several factors suggest that
the explanatory power of culture in this case is rather weak. First, recall that
existing research indicates that ethno-linguistically homogeneous societies are
less conducive to nonprofit activity than heterogeneous ones.1 36 While Taiwan
(contrary to common perception) is fairly heterogeneous on this level, Japan
and Korea are very homogeneous.1 37 Thus, Korea and Japan may have had to
overcome ethnic and social obstacles to activate their NPO sectors. Similarly,
to the extent that one acknowledges the existence of Confucian-laced "Asian
values" operating in the region, they would appear to undermine the
development of the NPO as a device to promote the assertion of legal rights,
unless somehow the collective nature of the NPO moderates the alleged
cultural distaste for individual legal action. More importantly, from my
perspective, surface commonalities in religious and philosophical traditions
135. See, e.g., Amir Licht et al., Culture Rules: The Foundations of the Rule of Law and Other
Norms of Governance 45-46 (June 9, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Journal of
International Law).
136. See, e.g., Salamon & Anheier, supra note 57, at 232-238.
137. On a commonly used scale of ethno-linguistic fractionalization, Japan scores 1, Korea 0,
and Taiwan 42, with higher scores for greater heterogeneity. By comparison, the United States scores 50
and India scores 89. See PHILIP G. ROEDER, ETHNOLINGuIsTIc FRACT1ONALIZATION (ELF) INDICES, 1961
AND 1985 (2001), http://weber.ucsd.edu/-proeder/elf.xls.
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among the three societies grow much more attenuated upon closer inspection,
making it difficult to identify a common cultural variable that could account
for this form of NPO activism. 138 Even assuming, somewhat counterfactually,
that Buddhism is a strongly shared contemporary religious tradition in these
countries, there is no evidence that a particular religious affiliation-as
opposed to religious competition 139- is conducive to NPO activity.
My aim is not to rule out culture completely as an explanatory variable.
The emergence of an NPO focused on investor protection in all three systems
seems motivated at least in part by a visceral animosity toward the "bounty
hunter" model of law enforcement prevalent in the United States 140-an
animosity that could plausibly have cultural origins. The point is simply that
culture seems far less promising as a line of inquiry for understanding the
emergence of NPOs as corporate law enforcement agents in East Asia than the
economic theories explored above. 141 Perhaps even more importantly, nothing
suggests that culture is so important to the story of these NPOs that their
experience cannot be replicated in other regions of the world.
V IMPLICATIONS
Understanding the role NPOs have played as corporate law enforcement
agents in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan advances both academic and policy
debates on corporate governance.
A. For Comparative Corporate Governance Literature
Two questions dominate the comparative corporate governance literature
today: precisely how does law matter to corporate governance?142 And are
corporate governance systems converging, specifically toward a shareholder-
oriented Anglo-American model? While views are divided along several lines
with respect to both debates, important areas of consensus have emerged from
existing scholarship. For example, it is widely accepted that the quality of law
enforcement is at least as important to "good" corporate governance as are
high-quality protections for minority shareholders located in the statutory law.
A second point of agreement is that in order to discern whether convergence is
occurring, the concept of convergence must be disaggregated into formal and
functional components. Convergence at the statutory (formal) level may not
eliminate differences in practice, for example, if differences in enforcement
138. For example, there are major variations in religious affiliation across the three countries-
Korea: 49% Christian, 47% Buddhist, 3% Confucian; Japan: 84% Shinto and Buddhist mixed, 0.7%
Christian; Taiwan: 93% Buddhist, Confucian, and Taoist mixed, 4.5% Christian. CENT. INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY, THE WORLD FACT BOOK (2002), http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook.
139. See James, supra note 56, at 397.
140. Consider that enactment of a class action suit mechanism and other plaintiff-friendly
procedural devices in the three legal systems would arguably eliminate the need for these organizations.
Indeed, Korea has just enacted a class action procedure for certain securities fraud cases.
141. See also PEKKANEN, supra note 118, at 15-16 (largely rejecting a cultural explanation of
civil society in Japan).
142. For a recent contribution to the debate discussing many of the approaches to this question,
see Stephen J. Choi, Law, Finance, and Path Dependence: Developing Strong Securities Markets, 80
TEX. L. REv. 1657 (2002).
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infrastructure remain. Furthermore, functional equivalents among systems
may lead to convergent effects even where significant differences remain at
the formal level. Both of these points find novel and previously unexplored
illustrations in East Asia's experience with NPOs as corporate law
enforcement agents.
1. Law Enforcement
Recognition of the importance of strong enforcement to good corporate
governance has prompted commentators to explore both the supporting
infrastructure for effective enforcement of corporate and securities laws and to
analyze functional substitutes for good local law and enforcement regimes.
Bernard Black's assessment of the legal and institutional preconditions of
strong securities markets is sobering, because, as he rightly concludes, the
"institutions... at the heart of a good national investor protection system...
are neither transplantable nor easily created.' ' 143 Certainly it would be folly to
assume that NPOs can take the place of honest and experienced courts or
sound procedural mechanisms for the promotion of individual investor claims.
But the East Asian experience should at least put scholars and policymakers
on notice that enforcement can take novel forms. While commentators have
explored a number of private and public enforcement alternatives, including
writing a corporate law that consciously minimizes the need for resort to legal
authority, 144 virtually no attention has been devoted to alternatives that lie
between private and public enforcement. Indeed, for reasons explored in
Section V.B, the NPO may be superior to the enforcement substitutes
currently in favor in the literature.
2. Convergence
The NPO as a supplier of investor protection is a highly distinctive
illustration of functional convergence: despite vast differences with the United
States at the level of formal laws and institutions, several societies have found
substitutes for the attorney-oriented incentive mechanisms and mass litigation
procedural devices relied upon in the United States to enhance corporate law
enforcement and investor protection. In fact, general antipathy toward such
mechanisms in East Asia makes the transplantation of these procedural
devices quite problematic, and probably motivated the search for a functional
substitute. Neither the NPO nor the "private attorney general" ensures an
optimal supply of investor protection, but these two enforcement mechanisms
are distinct paths toward the same goal.
NPOs may be less effective compared to other functional substitutes for
domestic enforcement, such as firms bonding themselves to "good" corporate
law by listing on a foreign stock exchange that imposes high disclosure
requirements and subjects listed firms to a stringent foreign (U.S.) regulatory
143. Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets,
48 UCLA L. REv. 781, 822 (2001).
144. See generally Black & Kraakman, supra note 1.
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and private enforcement regime. 145 But these NPOs are inherently domestic
organizations, and that attribute holds out the promise of improvement of local
law enforcement institutions. By contrast, the bonding alternative may
actually induce a further hollowing out of local regimes through the creation
of a lemons market,146 and these negative effects will ultimately reach even
the firms that have "escaped" their weak home country institutions through
foreign listings. As Bernard Black has pointed out, such escape is only partial:
"A company's reputation is strongly affected by the reputations of other firms
in the same country. And reputation unsupported by local enforcement and
other institutions isn't nearly as valuable as the same reputation buttressed by
those institutions."' 147 Thus, while it would be inaccurate to invest NPOs with
"functional equivalence" in comparison to more market-driven substitutes for
high-quality domestic enforcement regimes, NPOs hold out the unique
promise of actually improving, rather than abandoning, those local regimes.
Yet the experience of East Asia with NPOs as corporate law enforcers is
probably too nuanced to serve as strong support for the convergence
hypothesis. Even in their common use of the non-distribution constraint to
advance the objective of investor protection, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan
display striking diversity in the organizational form, strategy, and success of
their NPOs. As noted above, this diversity can be traced to the distinctive
legal, political, and social environments in which NPOs have emerged in the
three systems. Thus, while providing anecdotal evidence of one type of
convergence, the experience illustrates that "convergence" and "diversity" are
extraordinarily complex concepts in corporate governance that deeply
implicate domestic institutions far beyond the corporate law. 149
B. For Corporate Law Enforcement in Transition Economies
There are no obvious solutions to the under-production of corporate law
enforcement in many countries around the world, other than major, long-term
investments in legal infrastructure and human capital. But for a partial answer
to the enforcement problem, NPOs appear to merit at least as much
consideration as promoting bonding through cross-listings, writing "self-
145. See generally Coffee, supra note 2.
146. A lemons market describes a type of market failure caused by information and verification
problems. Where buyers have difficulty distinguishing high-quality goods from low-quality goods
(lemons), they will treat all goods on the market as being of average quality. Above-average goods are
withdrawn from the market, prompting buyers to lower their assessment of average quality, and
triggering a new round of withdrawals of above-average goods. The same downward spiral could afflict
local securities exchanges if investors believe that "above-average" firms cross-list on foreign exchanges.
147. Black, supra note 143, at 784.
148. Academics have recently been preoccupied with the question of whether corporate
governance systems are converging, specifically toward an "Anglo-American," shareholder-oriented
model. The developments in East Asia analyzed here provide two strands of support for convergence
optimists. They illustrate functional convergence at work, and demonstrate new found concern for
shareholder welfare in systems that at least traditionally have not been characterized as shareholder
driven. Yet the NPOs in the three systems also vividly illustrate the continuing impact of diverse legal,
political, and social systems on organizational structures, which is the contention underlying the position
of convergence pessimists.
149. See Curtis J. Milhaupt, Property Rights in Firms, 84 VA. L. REv. 1145 (1998) (discussing
the importance of local property rights and enforcement institutions to the convergence question).
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enforcing" corporate laws, or transplanting the "private attorney general"
model. In this section, I briefly outline the major advantages and problems of
NPOs as suppliers of investor protection.
One benefit of NPOs as shareholder activists is that the non-distribution
constraint confers a built-in safeguard against frivolous litigation. Because the
enforcement agent is an organization with limited funding and a legal or
reputational constraint on the distribution of profits to its controlling members,
it must be very selective about the cases it pursues. The non-distribution
constraint removes upside incentives to gamble on long-shot cases, and
limited endowments or other sources of funding create the risk of
organization-ending financial losses in the event of poor case selection. Courts
may also be more inclined to trust the litigation decisions of plaintiffs
represented by NPOs, so that the NPO form economizes on the use of
procedural screens for litigation without merit. In these respects, nurturing
NPOs to supplement law enforcement may be superior to transplanting
attorney compensation mechanisms and the complementary apparatus needed
to dampen the risk of strike suits.
While risk aversion on the part of NPOs may cause them to pass up
some meritorious cases, as compared to attorneys, the litigation decisions of
NPOs may be better from a social welfare perspective. Unlike attorneys, the
members of NPOs internalize the costs of their litigation decisions (at least in
the absence of government subsidies). NPOs are more likely than for-profit
firms to bring cases where the principal gain from the litigation is improved
corporate governance-in the form of deterrence, commitments from the firm
to institute new practices, or the generation of precedent. Indeed, one
important reason NPOs may have emerged in East Asia to perform corporate
law enforcement functions is that shareholder litigation in the region generally
has a negative net present value, for the reasons outlined in the previous
section of this Article. Only an NPO, operating with non-financial motives,
would take on such cases. By contrast, for-profit firms bring shareholder
lawsuits in the United States because financial payouts are a likely (and
perhaps often the exclusive) gain from the litigation.
Another benefit of the NPO as supplier of investor protection is that it
leaves open the possibility of improvement in both government and market
alternatives, and may in fact spur such improvements. The NPO can be
viewed as a transitional device that may be competed out of existence when
alternative supplies of law enforcement public goods are developed. Direct
shareholder activism and corporate law enforcement by NPOs is not seen in
the United States and the United Kingdom because it is not needed. The
Shareholder Ombudsman's role in the Japanese corporate governance
environment seems limited in part because there is less need for such an
organization in Japan than in Korea and Taiwan. There may come a time
when the shareholder activist NPOs of Japan, Taiwan, and Korea will wither
away or pursue other objectives as the investor protection environment
improves or as for-profit enforcers (attorneys) take over a larger share of the
market.
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Finally, as noted above, NPOs are a distinctly local approach to
improving the quality of law enforcement. Unlike "self-enforcing" models of
corporate law or cross-listing on foreign exchanges by local firms, NPOs seek
to use and improve, rather than escape, domestic enforcement institutions.
This discussion is not meant to suggest that the NPO model of corporate law
enforcement that has emerged in East Asia is inherently superior to the
"bounty hunter" model relied upon the United States. Rather, the point is that
the two models have emerged in response to quite different enforcement
environments. Both models have their limitations, and the role of NPOs in
East Asian corporate governance should not be overstated. Each of the three
organizations has achieved a measure of success in its home jurisdiction. But
substantial gaps remain in the enforcement of corporate and securities laws-
gaps that probably cannot be filled solely by NPOs. The problems with the
nonprofit form are well recognized; "voluntary failure" is as palpable a
phenomenon as "government failure" and "market failure. ' 5 Many NPOs
tend to be chronically short of funding because "they must rely largely upon
donations, retained earnings, and debt for capital financing, since by definition
they do not issue equity." Due to funding shortages, NPOs pay only modest,
if any, salaries to their professional staffs. Thus, expertise also tends to be in
chronically short supply.
Moreover, the governance of NPOs themselves can be highly
problematic. There are several reasons to believe that agency problems are
most severe in nonprofit firms, since many of the constraints operating in the
for-profit economy are missing from the NPO environment. As one
commentator notes:
[l]n the nonprofit world, owners are not well-defined; their voting rights are questionable
or non-existent; charitable goals are ambiguous, or at least difficult to quantify; no
significant second-order markets operate; and the residual claimants are either unable to
monitor effectively or unwilling to do so.... There is no market for corporate control;
there are no proxy battles, no shareholder derivative suits, and there is very little market
competition.
Given these serious limitations, the NPO form should best be viewed as an
early stage or supplementary supplier of investor protection, particularly in
transition economies, rather than a full-scale substitute for development of
good public and private enforcement institutions. Thus, in East Asia, for
example, creating better market-oriented mechanisms for the private supply of
enforcement services-such as through the introduction of class action and
civil discovery systems, and enhancements in the number and business
background of judges and lawyers-properly remains on the agenda of all
three countries discussed.
150. Lester Salamon, Of Market Failure, Voluntary Failure, and Third-Party Government:
Toward a Theory of Government-Nonprofit Relations in the Modern Welfare State, 16 J. VOLUNTARY
ACTION REs. 29 (1987).
151. Hansmann, supra note 6, at 877.
152. Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organizations, 27 Wis.
L. REv. 227, 227-28 (1999). See also Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit
Directors and Officers: Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631 (1998)
(discussing the lack of accountability and poor corporate governance in the nonprofit sector).
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The potential of NPOs in corporate governance seems most promising in
the People's Republic of China. Until very recently, private investors had
virtually no recourse against management for losses resulting from fraudulent
corporate activity. While China's highest court recently issued rules allowing
investors to sue companies for misleading securities disclosures, observers are
skeptical of the impact of this development on corporate governance because
of the prohibitive cost and time-consuming nature of litigation in China, as
well as other institutional weaknesses in the law enforcement system. 153
Yet commentators have begun to recognize the potential of NPOs in
advancing the rule of law in China. One study argues that while NPOs in
China remain highly constrained by the political, regulatory and social climate,
they can play a role in law enforcement. 154 Given that the government itself
seems committed, at least within certain parameters, to a healthy corporate
governance environment, a Taiwan-style partnership between the state and a
corporate law enforcement-oriented NPO seems highly feasible, at least where
such activities do not have overtly political overtones, such as exposing
corruption in state-owned enterprises or targeting the most high-profile firms.
China already has a state-sponsored NPO in the consumer protection area that
could serve as a model for a nonprofit shareholder protection organization.
155
The NPO form may have potential in other transition economies as well, and a
principal motivation for this Article was to spur examination of that
possibility in other regions of the world. The notion of nonprofits as suppliers
of investor protection is not novel in other systems suffering from low-quality
corporate law and governance. For example, in Russia, a former securities
regulator founded the Institute of Corporate Law and Corporate
156Governance. The Institute provides legal consulting services and has created
an index to measure the quality of corporate governance among major Russian
firms to enhance investment and voting decisions among investors.157 But the
activities of this organization are less direct than those of its East Asian
counterparts, as it does not seek to become an investor itself in order to
exercise shareholder rights. Drawing on the East Asian experience,
organizations such as this might possibly make even larger contributions as
153. See, e.g., Walter Hutchens, Private Securities Litigation in China: Material Disclosure
About China's Legal System? (Aug. 24, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Journal
of International Law).
154. See C. David Lee, Legal Reform in China: A Role for Nongovernmental Organizations, 25
YALE J. INT'L L. 363 (2000).
155. See id. The organization is the China Consumers' Association, which performs quasi-
regulatory functions under the supervision of state agencies. This group is a so-called banguan, banmin
(half-state, half-citizen) entity, which seeks to influence legislation, conducts inspections, handles
consumer complaints, and advances consumer education. See Yuanyuan Shen, Consumer Rights
Protection in China's Transformation from Plan to Market 221-35 (1998) (unpublished J.S.D.
dissertation, University of Wisconsin Law School) (on file with The Yale Journal of International Law).
The Consumers' Association seems like a very promising model for a "half-state, half-citizen" Chinese
corporate governance organization.
156. See supra note 8.
157. See The Institute of Corporate Law and Corporate Governance, CORE-rating and
Reviews, at http://www.iclg.ru/enrating (last visited Dec. 15, 2003).
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corporate governance activists by becoming more directly involved as
corporate law enforcement agents.
If the East Asian NPO activity has been a successful supplement to
corporate law enforcement and improvement in the corporate governance
climate in those systems, a crucial question follows: can the model be
replicated elsewhere? Or to put the question in the form presented in the
Introduction, why is the phenomenon of corporate law enforcement by NPO
shareholder activists not witnessed more widely around the world?
In order for NPOs to work in the investor protection area, an elusive
alchemy of factors must come together: rising demand for investor protection
that is neither adequately met by the state through legal reform and improved
enforcement, nor by private initiative; a supply of adequately trained social
entrepreneurs to do the work; a local climate that is not hostile to their efforts;
and at least moderately effective courts and other legal mechanisms to
effectuate corporate law enforcement. Some countries have large and active
NPO sectors, but corporate law-related public goods are supplied sufficiently
by the state and the private sector, eliminating the need for NPO action in the
area. The United States is perhaps the best example. Other countries have
considerable government and market "failures" in the production of corporate
law-related public goods, but the legal, political, and social climates are not
conducive to the formation of NPOs. China may be an example-though, as
noted above, there is reason to be optimistic about the potential role for an
NPO in Chinese corporate governance. 158 Perhaps elsewhere, such as
transition economies, NPO supply and demand conditions are ripe, but the
legal machinery is simply inadequate to the task of investor protection by any
actor. Thus, the East Asian experience may be the manifestation of a
fortuitous, fleeting-and hard to replicate-alchemy.
But a more optimistic perspective is also possible. Because different
jurisdictions approach NPOs from different legal, regulatory, social, and
institutional frameworks, there seems to be no single "recipe for success" in
creating investor protection organizations and no single audience elsewhere to
whom the positive East Asian experience should be directed. It appears that
NPOs exhibit considerable organizational isomorphism, replicating broader
traits of local conditions. Thus, depending on local conditions, government
regulators and enforcement authorities, legal and finance professionals, or the
local investor community may play the lead role in such an organization.
From the East Asian experience, for example, it appears that both "grass-
roots" and "government-affiliated" organizations can play a useful role,
depending on the prevailing conditions in the local system. Nor is one type of
organization inherently superior to another. A government-affiliated investor
protection NPO such as Taiwan's SFI may lack a degree of political
independence, but is likely to be better funded and staffed than organizations
such as PSPD and Shareholder Ombudsman which assiduously avoid ties with
the government. The one common essential ingredient in all three NPOs
appears to be a core group of devoted professionals willing to contribute time
158. See supra notes 153-155 and accompanying text.
2004]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 29:169
and expertise to the creation of investor protection as a public good. For that,
corporate law enforcement and good governance probably must be viewed as
a high priority, not only for the benefit of the investment community, but also
for the improvement of society as a whole.
With a better understanding of the East Asian experience, appropriate
audiences elsewhere may derive lessons useful to their own local
environments. That, in any event, has been a principal motivation for this
Article.
VI. CONCLUSION
High-quality enforcement is one key to good corporate governance, yet
it remains an elusive goal in many countries. To date, virtually all
commentators grappling with this problem have focused their attention on
conventional enforcements tools-attorney-incentive mechanisms, cross-
listing on foreign stock exchanges, and market-oriented gatekeepers. Yet the
activities of nonprofit organizations in the three largest market economies of
East Asia indicate the potential for other creative solutions to the under-
production of corporate law enforcement that afflicts many economies.
While we lack a complete theory to explain the emergence of producers
of public goods in corporate governance, existing theory on the role of NPOs
deepens our understanding of the East Asian experience and can possibly
allow us to leverage that experience for reform efforts elsewhere. As sensible
extensions of existing theory would suggest and the evidence from East Asia
confirms, nonprofit organizations of various types can play an important, if
supplemental, role in corporate law enforcement. This is particularly true
where political or ideological constraints put brakes on the development of
attorney-centered mechanisms resembling those heavily relied upon in the
United States. To be sure, NPOs suffer from their own weaknesses and appear
to flourish only in certain social and legal environments. Yet where NPOs can
be activated to provide investor protection, they may provide a solution to the
under-production of corporate law enforcement that is superior to the "private
attorney general" model so heavily relied upon in the United States, because
the non-distribution constraint is a built-in check on over-enforcement. And
because the NPO seeks to use and improve the local enforcement regime, it
avoids the lemons problem inherent in solutions that bypass weak domestic
institutions. As such, NPOs deserve consideration as transitional or
supplemental corporate law enforcement devices in many countries around the
world. Fostering an environment conducive to NPO formation, and
developing creative partnerships between government agencies and nonprofit
organizations for the betterment of corporate governance, seem more feasible
than transplanting class action mechanisms and attorney incentive schemes
from the United States-and are at least as worthy of consideration as trying
to write self-enforcing corporate laws for numerous countries.
Careful examination of the nonprofit experience in this region also
illustrates the complexities inherent in the question of whether national
corporate governance systems are converging. On the one hand, the three
largest market economies in East Asia, experiencing similar economic and
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social trends, have spontaneously converged on a distinctive corporate law
enforcement mechanism to address similar gaps in their public and private
infrastructure for investor protection. As such, this development is a novel
illustration of functional convergence with U.S. enforcement mechanisms.
Delving deeper into this important point of convergence, however, one
discovers great diversity in organizational form, strategy, and the relationship
between the nonprofit organization and the state-differences intimately
linked to the distinctive political and social structures in which these novel
forms of investor protection emerged.

